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The paper takes an incisive shot at the systemic inadequacies that have tiptoed into the 
economic order of the state over time via the apparently innocuous mechanism of withholding taxes. 
Withholding tax—a legitimate instrument of preponing the state revenues on clearly identifiable 
chunks of incomes—has historically been resorted to by most states, and to that extent it should be 
normal with Pakistan, too. However, what has happened in Pakistan is that the tool of withholding 
taxation has been used as a source of revenues way too large in scale, size, scope and intensity. In 
addition to the pulling forward of tax collection on clearly demarcated chunks of incomes, a large 
number of transactions have also been roped into its nexus and then charged to tax by 
presumptivising gross receipts as income—a withholdingisation of the sorts not only of the tax 
system but of the entire economic system as a weighty portion of ubiquitous withholding taxes gets 
stuck into the pricing structure of the final goods and services produced in the economy rendering 
them price-incompetitive in the international market. This overwhelming withholdingisation of the 
economic system, it is argued, has been brought about by a numb state continually operating under, 
using a Freudian framework, the “pleasure principle” instead of the “reality principle” with political 
governments complacently choosing to continue harvesting quick bucks into the exchequer, pushing 
the extractive system into a total disarray, the society into burgeoning civil strife, and the economy to 
the Dutch Disease effect. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The central dilemmas of collective life are embodied in the question of 
taxation.”1 
Historically, the state has raised extractive structures, inter alia, to meet its 
expenditure needs with taxes availing centrality and forming foundational pillars of most 
public finance systems. Tax defined as “a compulsory contribution to the government, 
imposed in the common interest of all, for the purpose of defraying the expenses incurred 
in carrying out the public functions…without reference to the special benefits conferred 
on the one making the payment,”2 manifests itself in multiple forms and models. In order 
to achieve cardinal objectives, that is, equity, neutrality, and certainty, states have 
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1Evan S. Lieberman, Race and regionalism in the politics of taxation in Brazil and South Africa, 
Cambridge studies in comparative politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
2R.W. McGee, The philosophy of taxation and public finance  (Springer US, 2011). 16. 
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experimented with differing taxing models. Since different taxes have varying yield 
times—Income Tax, Wealth Tax, and Capital Gains Tax being annual levies; Value 
Added Tax including its variants like Sales Tax, General Sales Tax, and Excise duties 
being monthly or activity-based levies; Gift Tax and Inheritance Tax (Estate Duty) being 
occurrence-dependent charges—governments are always striving to find ways and means 
to reduce the lag between the point at which revenues become due, and the point at which 
those can actually be collected—that is, by advance payment of taxes.  
This objective is generally achieved through two modes i.e. advance taxes3and 
withholding taxes.4 In the sub-continental context, the fiction of advance tax was 
introduced during 1940s purely as a war measure to harvest quick bucks into the 
exchequer, “combat inflation and to withdraw a part of the unprecedented amount of 
currency in circulation.”5 To be exact, “‘advance tax’ popularly styled as ‘pay as you 
earn’ scheme was introduced in 1944,” and it covered “all types of taxable income 
(except salaries and interest on securities where provision already existed for 
deduction at source) exceeding twenty-five thousand rupees.”6 It was observed that 
though “like many other innovations in taxation legislation, this innovation also has 
outlived its used by date which gave it birth,”7 over time, the payment of advance tax 
in instalments has become a necessity; an important ingredient of most public finance 
systems across the globe.  
Withholding tax, on the other hand, has rather deeper roots in time. Not only that 
its origins can be traced as far back in history as 1512, but also that “most forms of direct 
taxation during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries contained taxation at source, and that its 
use increased with the passage of time.”8 The importance of withholding taxation 
continued to increase throughout “the nineteenth century as the income tax evolved into a 
major form of direct taxation.”9 During the British period, the mechanism of withholding 
tax, for the first time, was introduced in 1861, and salary income of government 
employees was brought under its scope.10 It was argued that due to the application of 
withholding tax, the contribution of government employees “to the fisc rose from 14 per 
cent in 1860, to 21 percent in 1864.”11 Over the past one and a half century since, the 
withholding regime has considerably expanded in most countries eliciting arguments both 
for and against its application, and expansion.  
In Pakistan’s context, justifying the need and efficacy of withholding regime, 
Khan posits that “since withholding taxes are transaction related, they are easy to 
 
3“Advance tax” implies approximation and payment by a person in monthly or quarterly instalments of 
his total annual tax liability worked out on the basis of estaimated total annual taxable income. 
4“Withholding tax” refers to deduction of certain percentage of various types of incomes at the very 
payment or release stage. 
5This observation was made in Prushottamdas vs. Commissioner Income Tax, 48 ITR 206(2011). 
6GOP, “The Taxation Enquiry Committee Report (Volume 1)” (Karachi: Ministry of Finance, 1960), 150. 
7Prushottamdas vs. Commissioner Income Tax. 
8P. E. Soos, The origins of taxation at source in England  (Amsterdam: IBFD, 1997). 
9Stephen Dowell, A history of taxation and taxes in England  (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 
1865). 
10C. L. Jenikens, “Legislative comment—1860: India’s first income tax,” British Tax Review XX, no. 
87 (2012). 
11Ibid. 
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collect.”12 He also asserts that “in a country like Pakistan where the economy is 
predominantly un-documented and outreach of the department is limited,” withholding 
“taxes easily cover some otherwise difficult sources of income.”13 He goes on to maintain 
that taxpayers also “find it convenient as their annual tax burden is spread over the year, 
helping them discharge their tax liability in instalments,” and that “withholding tax 
regime provides considerable documentation to the economy and effective control 
to…escapement of income being all pervasive in the economy.”14 Withholding taxes 
have also been credited as being able to “provide a clear picture to the other economic 
partners and prospective investors about the taxation regime and serves as important 
source of policy initiatives of a country.”15 It is logical that, given its wide-going merits, 
at-source withholding is worldwide recognised as a legitimate tool of fast-forwarding of 
revenue collection.  
However, what has happened in Pakistan in this context is completely different. 
What happened in Pakistan was no preponing of tax collection on clearly demarcated 
chunks of revenues that, as per accepted accounting norms, have attained the character 
of income in the hands of their recipients or are likely to do that; it is rather tantamount 
to withholdingisation of the entire tax system; perhaps the entire economic system. 
Withholdingisation could operationally be defined as the process of envelopment of 
economic market whereby at every single stage in the economic chain the state chooses 
to expropriate a chunk of the value of each transaction—a sort of Chinacutting of 
transactions.16 The state’s ostensible journey from withholding to withholdingisation—
intense and all-pervading as it has been, inter alia, was marked by a brutal sprawl of 
tentacles of withholding regime aggressively grabbing more and more areas of 
economic activity into its fold with every year passing over the past three decades. 
When disaggregated, withholdingisation appears to have been attended by and 
evidenced in an increase of withholding tax provisions being legislated into the fiscal 
code; tally of withholding provisions brought within the purview of Presumptive Tax 
Regime (PTR); application of withholding regime to transactions as against incomes; 
extension of withholding regime to admit of collection at source (CAS) as against 
deduction at source (DAS);17 share of withholding taxes as percentage of total 
revenues;  reallocation of resources by the revenue administration to intenser and 
deeper monitoring of withholding regime; stringency and toughness being brought into 
the punitive and prosecutive implications for defaulting withholders; number of 
 
12Sardar Aminullah Khan, “Standard operating procedure for monitoring of withholding taxes,” 




16“Chinacutting” is a term that is specifically used in Pakistani journalistic circles and refers to a 
process whereby land grabbing goons known as “land mafia” surreptiusouly occupy, cut, build, and usurp parts 
(generally nooks and corners) of precious private and public lands lying unattended for a time. The 
phenomenon being a major governance challenge is quite prevalent in cities like Karachi, Lahore, and Quetta. 
17The DAS mode refers to the process whereby tax is withheld at source by a fixed percentage on the 
release of payments that are in the nature of INCOME. On the contrary, the CAS mode implies application of 
almost the same process but on PAYMENTS undertaken in the economy for sale/purchase of goods and 
services—including intermediary ones. 
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economic transactions being made to suffer withholding taxes at both ends; and 
transference of cost of collection from the state exchequer to the citizenry. The paper 
premises that withholdingisation being applicable at each joint in the transaction chain 
cumulatively enhances the end-price of goods and services being produced in the 
economy—triggering a process that could operationally be dubbed as taxflation18—
inflation (increase in prices) due to taxation—much of which is neither due, nor 
adjusted nor refunded.19 The data of a select set of withholding provisions, year-wise 
tax withheld thereunder during T/Ys 2012 to 2016, total tax claimed and percentage of 
tax withheld remaining unclaimed is presented in Table 1. 
In all categories, the tax claimed in tax returns far exceeds the tax withheld. In 
fact, out of the total tax withheld at Rs. 451.6 billion under just 10 withholding provisions 
only 101.9 i.e. 77.4 percent was claimed.20 This is what makes the economic outputs 
overpriced in both production and consumption markets of the economy, and 
uncompetitive internationally and unaffordable domestically for the lower rung 
consumers. Since economics is the basic most ingredient of any social fabric, 
withholdingisation of the economic system (national web of economic transactions) can 
have far-reaching implications for the economy, the society and the state. To make things 
worse and worrisome both the society and the polity are quite oblivious of the negative 
dimensions of withholdingisation. 
Table 1 
Withholding Provisions—Tax Withheld, Claimed & Unclaimed 
Year/ 








Section 236 36.9 27.1 51.9 44.6 47.6 208.1 19.9 90.4 
Section 231A 12.2 12.0 18.6 23.2 28.6 94.6 43.5 54.0 
Section 231B 1.2 1.1 3.2 7.4 7.5 20.4 10.7 47.5 
Section 234 3.3 3.6 6.3 6.5 8.9 28.6 8.4 70.6 
Section 236A X X 13.6 3.0 3.6 20.2 7.3 63.8 
Section 236C X X 0.7 1.5 2.1 4.3 1.4 67.0 
Section 236K X X X 4.0 6.2 10.2 3.2 67.0 
Section 236D X X 0.7 0.6 0.7 2.0 4.7 335^ 
Section 236I X X 1.2 1.9 2.5 5.6 1.1 80.0 
Section 236P X X X X 21.6 21.6 1.7 92.0 
Total 53.6 43.8 96.2 92.7 129.3 451.6 101.9 77.4 
*Source: FBR/DRS/PRAL; X = Withholding tax provision was not yet legislated. ^Implies excess tax claims. 
 
18“Taxflation” has been used in the paper in a sense slightly different from the one that is generally 
associated with it whereby an inflation-related increase in income pushes its recipent into higher applicable tax 
brackets off-setting the impact of increase in income—something also known as “bracket-creep.” 
19This is because, theoretically speaking, all direct taxes are supposed to be borne by a payer of the tax 
himself. 
20For an in-depth analysis see Faisal Mushtaq Dar, “Unjust taxation in Pakistan,” (Peshawar: National 
Institute of Management, 2017). 
21Section 236 deals with CAS mode taxation on mobile phone cards; section 231A with DAS mode on 
cash withdrawals; section 231B with CAS mode on vehicle registration; section 234 with CAS mode on token 
tax renewal; section 236A with CAS mode on auction of property; section 236C with CAS mode on sale of 
immovable property; 236K with CAS taxation on purchase of immovable property; section 236D with CAS 
mode on marriage halls; and section 236I in CAS mode on educational institutions. 
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The paper, by adopting narrow-to-wide angle approach, explains the process of 
withholdingisation in Pakistan in detail, and brings out its implications in different 
domains—extractive system, economy (and its various sectors), and the polity. It argues 
that withholdingisation has perverted the extractive system of the state, disengaged it 
from the macroeconomic framework and resultantly contributed towards enhancement of 
the extant economic status quo. The process of withholdingisation has occurred at the 
same time as the process of defanging, stunting and weakening of the (traditional) tax 
system—the hallmark of all well-functional states. The state’s mad rush into 
withholdingisation has a method in madness and may have been undertaken with a 
purpose and under a grander design of things. This is what makes withholdingisation an 
elitist enterprise in Pakistan. In this sense of the matter, withholdingisation becomes the 
parameter of Pakistan tax system, and therefore, a highly worthy and intriguing subject of 
enquiry. The paper looks to peg withholdingisation and all what it stands for the state in 
the elitist framework already developed, and dissect and lay bare its various dimensions 
with a view to seeing if it really is an abundant source of revenue, or Dutch Disease? This 
is the cardinal two-pronged overarching research question that the paper looks to answer 
in some depth.  
The paper is divided into 7 sections. After Section 1 has introduced the subject, 
Section 2 develops the requisite theoretical framework within which to analyse the 
process of withholdingisation in Pakistan. While Section 3 critically traces its evolution 
through the nation’s history, Section 4 unravels the underlying mechanics and nuts and 
bolts of withholdingisation and expands its concept to cognise it as the new normal of 
Pakistan’s economic system. Section 5 lays bare the relationship between 
withholdingisation and tax collection cost, and seminally develops the concept of 
national tax collection cost and modifies that of taxflation to fit the spatial context. 
Section 6—the very core of the paper—dissects withholdingisation in three separate parts 
i.e. as a source of revenue, civil strife, and Dutch Disease, and without being monocausal, 
argues that this may perhaps be the most critical pull-back factor operating on the 
economy impelling its underperformance in most critical areas—including receding 
exports, home remittances, and foreign investment. Section 7 summarises the debate with 
forebodings for the future. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Although, the elitist framework has long been exploited to interpret Pakistan’s 
power and politico-economic structures,22 yet Ahmed contrived the convenient 
conceptual vehicle of Elites Ltd, crystallised the elitist model, and expanded its scope to 
systematically analyse the monopolisation of Pakistan’s extractive function, and 
disaggregated it to comprehend various mutually reinforcing dynamics and cross-cutting 
 
22See, for instance, Asaf Hussain, “Elites and political development in Pakistan,” The Developing 
Economies 14, no. 3 (1976); Hamza Alavi, “The state in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh” New 
Left Review 1, no. 74 (1972); Saeed Shafqat, Political system of Pakistan and public policy: Essays in 
interpretation  (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989); Ishrat Husain, Pakistan: The economy of an elitist state  
(Karachi: OUP, 1999); Stanley A. Kochanek, Interest groups and development: Business and politics in 
Pakistan  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Hamza Alavi, “Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and 
Ideology,” in state and ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, ed. Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (Hong 
Kong: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988). 
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mechanics at work by way of an explanation of its historically embedded low 
performance.23 The state’s political crust, it is argued therein, is essentially underpinned 
by Elites Ltd which, in turn, is composed of seven effective elite groups i.e. industrial 
elite, business elite, religious elite, feudal elite, military elite, and sundry (judicial, media, 
non-profits, and professional) elite; that while elites enter into zero-sum transactions on 
the political chessboard, they resort to non-zero-sum transactions in the economic realm; 
that elites face a rational actor dilemma in that they need a state to govern but they also 
want to maintain it at least cost to themselves; that in order to resolve this dilemma, the 
elitist state takes to optimally extract from international sources; and that since an infinite 
international extraction is not possible, it descends down to undertake internal extraction 
through six unwholesome and perverse modes by way of domestic resource-match24—
withholding taxes being one such mode. Ahmed reckons extraction as a critical variable 
of state-building, and in Pakistan’s context, lays bare the level of importance which 
various societal agents accord to it, and enquires into how elites, after effectively 
monopolising the infrastructure of the state i.e. means of production,25 take to exploit the 
superstructure of the state to numb and opiate the citizenry to conveniently rig the 
extractive policy formulation process and weaken the extractive arm.26 This position is 
based on the premise that only a weak extractive system can help elites underwrite full 
control over their riches that they amass over time through monopolisation and 
manipulation of the infrastructure, and maintenance of the economic status quo. He 
further posits that in order to achieve their spurious agenda of maintaining and enhancing 
the economic status quo, at strategic level, Elites Ltd forms alliance with the Generalist 
Juggernaut—generalist cadres of Pakistan civil services—an elites-generalist duopoly of 
sorts.27 The paper looks to operationalise the conceptual framework recapitulated 
hereinabove, by lowering down its focus to one elitist tactical ploy—
withholdingisation—and by breaking it into its elements, and seeing how it pans out in 
the overall scheme of statecraft in Pakistan, and by gauging its implications for the 
people, the economy, and the system.  
The paper seeks to induct Freud’s competing psychological concepts of “the 
pleasure principle” and “the reality principle” into this political economy analysis of the 
extractive function to supplement the theoretical underpinnings and explain the state’s 
submissive descend into withholdingisation with all its wide-going destructive potential. 
The pleasure principle implies the drive through which a person seeks pleasure and looks 
to satisfy his or her biological (and other) needs simultaneously avoiding pain, suffering 
and hard work—say, for instance, adolescent phase of human life. However, as one 
attains maturity, spontaneous pleasure-seeking is overtaken by the reality principle.—
operating conditions of the real world. Once dominance of the reality principle is 
established, the search for fulfilment of needs and satisfaction does not take the most 
 
23Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed, “Pakistan: Extraction, elites and state autonomy: A theoretical 
configuration,” The Pakistan Development Review, 56(4), (2017). 
24Ibid. 
25For a detailed analysis see Husain, Pakistan: The economy of an elitist state: 133. 
26Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed, “Pakistan: State-building, extraction, and (misplaced) societal 
preferences,” Journal of International Stability Studies 2, no. 1 (2016). 
27Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed, “Pakistan’s governance goliath: The case of non-professional chairman, 
F.B.R,” The Pakistan Development Review, 55(4) (Winter) (2016). 
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direct route, but instead defers attainment of its goal in accordance with the conditions 
imposed by the external world and operating realities.28 It has been remarked that both 
“the reality principle and the pleasure principle pursue personal gratification, but the 
crucial difference between the two is that the reality principle is more focused on the 
long-term and is more goal-oriented while the pleasure principle disregards everything 
except for the immediate fulfilment of its desires.”29 At some level, Freud knew and 
underscored “the potentially destructive aspects of the blind quest for pleasure,” 30 when 
he posited “that the pleasure principle seems actually to serve the death drives.”31 It has 
been asserted that “unconscious persistence of the pleasure principle turns the mind’s 
internal state of nature into a looming threat, and ever-present potentiality of 
chaos…justifying a tyranny in the mind as necessary to prevent disastrous and 
pathological potentialities from turning into overwhelming eventuality.”32 Moreover, 
excessive zealousness to pursue pleasure produces “an unpleasurable and wasteful 
situation,” in the longer run.33 The study borrows from Freud to argue that Pakistani state, 
for most part of its history, has operated under “the pleasure principle” at the expense of 
the “the reality principle” although most functional states operate or aspire to operate 
under the latter principle. By way of aside, it could be remarked that Pakistani state’s 
below par performance on most fronts could well be interpreted in terms of its preference 
for and gravitation toward the pleasure principle—always repressing the reality principle 
for a later day; into the future—that has never come. 
In order to examine the state’s constant drift into withholdingisation, Anuj Desai’s 
work that he undertook to explore into the intrusion of withholding tax into the US system 
with its grit and stubbornness to stay there despite efforts aimed at its elimination, would be 
insightful.34 Desai brings in a couple of powerful legalese, namely, “Entrenchment” and 
“Superstatute,” and examines the impact of the Current Tax Payment Act, 1943, through 
which, withholding tax on Wages was introduced in the US in the wake of World War II-
induced increase in public expenditure. Desai borrows Eskridge & Ferejohn’s notion of 
Entrenchment35 which no longer means “simply an unelected judiciary overriding an elected 
legislature or executive”36 but an expanded concept under which “entrenchment becomes a 
more complex phenomenon, whereby statutes—the product of legislatures themselves—can 
in turn act to bind future legislatures.”37 A Superstatute, on the contrary refers to a law or a 
legal convention “that seeks to establish a new normative or institutional framework for state 
policy and that has a broad effect on the law due to its cultural influence, in such a manner that 
 
28David Rook, “The buying impulse,” The Journal of Consumer Research 14, no. September (1987). 
29Ibid. 
30J.A Brunner, Freud and the politics of psychoanalysis  (Piscataway NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
1999). 73. 
31S. Freud, Beyond the pleasure principle  (Dover Publications, 2015). 
32Brunner, Freud and the Politics of Psychoanalysis: 75. 
33Ibid., 77. 
34Anuj C. Desai, “What A History of Tax Wtihholding Tells Us About the Relationship Between 
Statutes and Constitutional Law,” Northwestern University Law Review 108, no. 3 (2014). 
35W.N. Eskridge & J.A. Ferejohn, A republic of statutes: The new American constitution  (Yale 
University Press, 2010). 
36Desai, “What a history of tax wtihholding tells us about the relationship between statutes and 
constitutional law,” 861. 
37Ibid. 
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even constitutional provisions are interpreted with reference to it.”38 In order to better 
comprehend the exact contours of Superstatute, Desai explores into the history of withholding 
taxes in the post-WWII scenario in the US, “explaining in turn how that history sheds light on 
the underlying notion of a superstatue.”39 The paper admits both Entrenchment and 
Superstatue—essentially countermajoritarian concepts—into the analytical framework to 
throw light on the withholdingisation in Pakistan under all regime types—democratic, 
authoritarian, and hybrid, and its innate ability to be ever-winner, ever on the expansion. Thus, 
while Ahmed provides theoretical platform shedding light on how the institutional 
infrastructure of the state is occupied, monopolised, and mobilised by Elites Ltd into action 
towards the achievement of its objectives using withholdingisation as a tested too, the 
Freudian pleasure principle and reality principle help explain how an elitised state 
conveniently and comfortably walks into withholdingisation—an obvious exhibition of the 
pleasure principle, and Desai provides a conceptual closure as to how it may not perhaps be 
possible to reverse the process of withholdingisation, and that the system is there to stay and 
get more and more perverted with time if the underlying political settlement continues to hold 





38H.A. Hamoudi, Negotiating in civil conflict: Constitutional construction and imperfect bargaining in 
Iraq  (University of Chicago Press, 2013). 29. 
39Desai, “What a history of tax wtihholding tells us about the relationship between statutes and 
constitutional law,” 859. 
40Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed, “Pakistan: Economy under elites—Tax amnesty schemes, 2018,” Asian 
Journal of Law and Economics 10, no. 2 (2019). In this particular paper “Amnestisation” was operationalised. 
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What the picture portrays is that at any given point in time, Pakistan is found 
operating under significant amount of fiscal stress, that is, its expenditures exceed its 
revenues. This means that Pakistani state every now and then finds itself at the inflection 
point—the crossroads—at which it has two choices i.e. either to strengthen the extractive 
system enough to undertake sufficient taxation like all functional states, which is also 
good enough to meet its expenditure needs or to resort to the easier yet perverse 
extraction through the seven domestic resource-match ploys. The Freudian analytical 
concepts of reality principle and pleasure principle amplify and illuminate option 
exercised by the state. The paper operationalses the above theoretical framework by 
juxtaposing withholdingisation therein and critically analysing it from all essential 
angles. 
 
3.  WITHHOLDINGISATION—EVOLUTION  
IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
While it has already been observed that the roots of withholding taxation are 
anchored as far back in time as early 16th century England, and mid-19th century British 
India, this section undertakes a brief rundown of withholdingisation-related developments 
that took place on this account in the post-1947 period. The evolution of 
withholdingisation in Pakistan is primarily traced by exploring into the development of 
the tax laws alongside a thorough analysis of various studies and reports that were 
conducted with the objective to reappraise and redesign the tax system to render it more 
responsive to fiscal imperatives of the state. But all, instead, ended up achieving 
diametrically the opposite—more withholdingisation. At independence, Pakistan 
conveniently adopted the pre-partition tax code with minimal changes.41 Since the British 
India government had already imposed withholding tax on Salary, Interest-on-Securities, 
Dividend, and (Super-tax) on Bonus Shares,42 it could safely be assumed that Pakistan’s 
withholding regime continued to stay confined to these very sources throughout 1950s. 
Under the system, the withholder was responsible to provide a certificate of deduction to 
the withholdee that the latter could furnish to the revenue service alongwith his return as 
a valid claim for payment of tax or that of refund. Naqvi had observed that the “essence 
of this system was the recovery of tax from the person who disburses income instead of 
from the person who receives income.”43  
In 1959, contract receipts were made liable to withholding tax in order to alleviate 
mounting pressure on the exchequer.44 This betrayed seeds of withholdingisation starting 
to germinate under the pleasure principle. The Taxation Enquiry Committee (TEC), 1960, 
affirmatively observing that the “principle of source deduction has been extended to 
supply of goods, contract payments etc. by the Finance Ordinance 1959”45—expressed 
oblique skepticism about its faithful implementation. It was around that time that the 
punitive implications for defaulting withholders also started to become more stringent. 
 
41The tax code adopted was The Income Tax Act, 1922. 
42S. M. Raza Naqvi, The income tax act, 1922  (Lahore: Taxation House, 1963). 
43Ibid. 619. 
44GOP, “Budget speech 1959-60,” in Budget Speeches 1947-48 To 1984-85 (Volume 1) (Islamabad 
1984). 
45GOP, “The taxation enquiry committee report (Volume 1) “ 149. 
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TEC normatively asserted that “If the person responsible for making a payment from 
which tax should have been deducted, fails to deduct it or having deducted tax, fails to 
deposit it in a Government Treasury, he is deemed in default in respect of such tax and 
personally held liable for its payment.”46 TEC also grappled with the cardinal question of 
“extending the principle of source deduction to other incomes,” that is, “to interest, rents, 
royalties, payments to contractors etc.”47 But then noting that contractual receipts had 
already been roped into the nexus of withholding scheme a year ago, TEC, teetering on 
the edge of withholdingisation, observed:  
We are of the view that, despite the effectiveness of the system in reducing 
opportunities for tax evasion, its extension is beset with certain obvious difficulties. 
It will, for instance, be difficult to ensure that the persons or agencies deducting tax 
at source will promptly deposit it in the Treasury. Again, in a large number of cases, 
the tax deducted at source will be in excess of the actual tax payable by the assessee. 
This will increase claims for refunds and put both the Administration and the tax-
payer to considerable inconvenience. The verification of the payment of tax into 
Government Treasury will delay the disposal of these claims. These are serious 
bottlenecks which have to be taken into consideration before extending the system to 
other sources of income. We have considered the question in its various aspects and 
would not recommend the extension of the system of source deduction to other 
items.48 
However, this muted and muffled resistance was not to last long as right at the 
onset of the 1960s, the state started to pursue the pleasure principle rather recklessly as 
withholdingisation spread its tentacles far and deep into the economic system. The 
Commission on Taxation and Tariff (CTT), 1966, remarked that a provision had already 
been “made for withholding a prescribed amount on account of income-tax out of 
payments made to contractors by Government and other public bodies mentioned in the 
Act.”49 CTT deliberated upon the matter at length and sought to consolidate 
withholdingisation gains stipulating that “necessary rules should be framed without 
further delay so that the relevant law relating to deduction of tax at source in the case of 
contractors is put into operation.”50 The reality principle, it appears, had started to lose 
ground very much during 1960s. 
The Taxation Commission (TC), 1974, defended and justified the systemic bathos 
into withholdingisation under the pleasure principle noting that in “a country where 
evasion takes place on a large scale, provisions relating to deduction of tax at source have 
to be properly implemented.51 It was for the first time that tax non-deduction was 
imperceptibly equated with tax evasion. TC also significantly focused non-
implementation of various withholding provisions, and vehemently harangued that the 
“provisions relating to deduction of tax at source, are not as effectively implemented as 





49Ibid. “The commission on taxation and tariff (Second Report),” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, 
1966), 14. 
50Ibid., 50. 
51Ibid. “The taxation commission report (Volume 1),” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, 1974), 203. 
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whereby in quite a few such “cases tax is evaded by persons who are responsible for 
deducting tax at source,”52 and expended substantial amount of energies to beef up the 
punitive regime. Thus, observing that the existing law pertaining to deductions at source 
was not being implemented fully, TC ended up recommending that penal provisions 
should be invoked in all such cases, and that every “notice or form which requires the 
deduction of tax at source should also bear a warning at the bottom, indicating the 
liability that a person incurs in failing to make deduction at source.”53 In 1976 imports 
were also made to pass under the withholding axe thereby introducing the CAS mode for 
the first time, and expanding the net of transaction-taxing in Pakistan. It is also about this 
time that the state’s focus starts to shift from the tax-payer to the tax-withholder as the 
one ultimately responsible to carry the state’s fiscal burden. 
The National Taxation Reform Commission (NTRC), 1986, looked to justify 
relentless withholdingisation, which by now had begun to emerge to the state with all its 
perverse potentialities as the only “viable” source of revenue repressing the reality 
principle deep down into its sub-consciousness. “The growing emphasis on current 
payments of tax,” it was remarked, “happens to be one of the most pervasive and 
significant world-wide trends in income tax administration,” and of “all current payment 
devices, withholding is the most common and generally the most significant in terms of 
its contribution to revenue collections.”54 Recognising and propagating withholding as 
the tool of tax policy—particularly that of curbing tax evasion and promoting tax 
compliance with reference to taxation of import-based transactions, NTRC stipulated that 
this “provision was incorporated in the law to enable the tax administration to reach the 
ever-increasing number of delinquent importer-taxpayers, who traditionally operate 
without any easily locatable business premises.”55 NTRC eulogising the process of 
withholdingisation argued that “the system of deduction at source has enabled the income 
Tax Department to bring a large number of taxpayers on its records,” and therefore 
“withholding net may be extended further” to brokerage and commission payments, and 
public transport owners.56 Interestingly, NTRC did recommend certain other measures to 
strengthen and capacitate the system but all such measures were conveniently ignored for 
implementation.  
The GOP-sponsored Study of Direct Taxation (STD), 1989, stands out in its rule-based 
and empirical appraisal of withholdingisation in Pakistan. STD took note of Pakistan’s 
irresistible slide into withholdingisation and asserted that if NTRC’s prescription to bring 
brokerage and commission payments into the ambit of withholding regime had been accepted, 
it would “have taken the wide-ranging system of withholding of tax in Pakistan as far as it can 
go.”57 STD while making this comment absolutely had no idea that it was merely a tip of the 
iceberg and that worse was yet to come. It was also cautioned that “Low withholding rates 








57Ibid. “Study of direct taxation,” (Islamabad: CBR, 1989), 64. 
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certainty but seem…to be unsatisfactory as a payment solution, since they produce a structure 
which favours the better off recipients.”58 The Committee on Tax Reforms (CTR), 1991, cast 
its vote unequivocally in favour of pushing withholdingisation further. CTR observed that “a 
large number of contractors and suppliers are getting their payments split into amounts below 
Rs. 50,000 to avoid the deduction limit,” and recommended that “the present limit of 
deduction at Rs. 50,000 under section 50(4) be reduced to Rs. 20,000 for all classes of 
recipients i.e. goods and services.”59 The change was readily effected through Finance Act, 
1991 giving traction to CAS mode and the process of withholdingisation as all critical 
economic indicators were seen going into downward spiral. If one were to pick a point at 
which withholding regime started to get fundamentally transformed from a standard tool of 
preponing of legitimate government dues to withholdingisation of the entire system, it was at 
the turn of 1990s.  
The Resource Mobilisation and Tax Reforms Commission (RMTRC), 1991, was 
established in continuation of and as a sequel to CTR right in the midst of extreme 
economic chaos and politico-strategic unrest chiefly generated by a waning US interest in 
the region in the wake of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The country’s appetite for 
revenues was insatiable and a fledgling democratic dispensation resurrected after a 
decade-long military rule was all willing to pursue the pleasure principle regardless of its 
consequences. RMTRC being an elitist initiative stands out for five significant points. 
One, RMTRC in innuendos claimed credit for and revelled in the success of 
withholdingisation when it argued that “the success of this regime is that the 
discretionary powers of the tax collectors have been reduced—for the simple reason that 
when ‘deductions at source’ predominate as they do now, the incidence of ‘collection of 
demand’ declines.”60 It was remarked that “while between 1984-85 and 1992-93 the 
‘deductions at source’ increased from 41.5 percent to 68.1 percent of total income tax 
collection, the ‘collection of demand’ fell from 25.2 percent to 9.1 percent during the 
same period.”61  
Two, RMTRC provided legitimation to income-presumptivisation of receipts for 
the first time assigning an entirely a new dimension to withholdingisation. “Initially, as a 
measure of reform, an attempt has been made,…to convert withholding taxes into 
presumptive taxes, representing fixed and final settlement of tax liabilities,” of which, 
“primary objective is to simplify the tax collection and to reduce the compliance cost of 
taxpayers.”62 Three, RMTRC provided politically loaded but theoretically misplaced 
justification for the inequity that was now grossly entrenched into the system. It was 
argued that the “tax system in Pakistan is by and large inequitable and violates the 
dictates of horizontal and vertical equity,” and while “horizontal equity is violated 
because agricultural income and service activities are inadequately taxed, or escape 
taxation altogether,” in fact, vertical equity was “also compromised because direct taxes 
contribute no more than 2.7 percent to the GDP; and this despite the fact that the recent 
 
58Ibid., 80. 
59Ibid. “The committee on tax reforms report,” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, 1991), B-29. 
60Ibid. “The resource mobilisation and tax reforms commission report,” (Islamabad: Ministry of 
Finance, 1994), 48. 
61Ibid. 
62Ibid., 52. 
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introduction of withholding and presumptive taxes has dramatically increased the direct-to-
indirect tax ratio to 23 percent or so.”63 RMTRC ill-argued that withholdingisation had 
“probably contributed to a greater (horizontal) equity of the tax system,” as it had led to 
“a more effective taxation of capital incomes, levy of withholding tax on income proxies, 
the introduction of taxes on agricultural wealth and the levy of excise duties on services 
like telephones consumed by the upper income groups.”64 This was quite an 
oversimplification of the complex equity concept already well-developed in the realms of 
political philosophy and political economy elsewhere in the world. 
Four, RMTRC looked repressing the reality principle. On the one hand, it 
candidly noted that “the switchover from withholding to fixed (presumptive) taxes in 
the case of contractors, importers, etc. has imparted the characteristics of indirect taxes 
to a component of the income tax,” and that “the regressivity of the tax burden has 
been accentuated by the introduction of the minimum tax,” whereby “the reduction in 
income tax rates has mostly benefited the upper income groups.”65 On the other hand, it 
argued that “overemphasis on the deduction of the tax collected at the source can take 
away the very pressures that are necessary to improving the administrative machinery 
by generating information about the tax-payer's taxable capacity, by spreading greater 
tax awareness among the public, and above all, by inculcating a “tax culture” among 
the people,” and as such, “taxation, based on self-assessment, must be according to the 
ability of the tax-payers to pay.”66 The capacitation of the revenue system as a viable 
alternative was deferred stating that “after the first phase of development of 
withholding and presumptive tax regimes, the focus in the second phase will have to 
shift to improvements in management and information system; assessment practices, 
speedy and fair disposal of appeals and more effective enforcement generally.”67 Not 
only that no roadmap or timelines were set out for the promised “second phase” but 
also that the same has never been realised even after a lapse of over two and a half 
decades. Five, RMTRC, in combine with TRC proved phenomenal towards extension 
and expansion of withholding net in Pakistan. In 1991, the system of 
deduction/withholding of tax at source for adjustment against tax as subsequently 
determined were converted into a presumptive tax. Likewise, a fixed tax at a flat rate of 
ten percent was imposed on Interest from financial institutions and on Dividend. In 
1992 a nominal withholding tax in CAS mode was enforced on exporters to be 
collected by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) at the time of the realisation of foreign 
exchange proceeds.68 RMTRC perhaps played the most important role in putting the 
economic system on the scaffolding of withholdingisation.   
The Task Force on Fiscal Reforms (TFFR), 1996, substantially helped consolidate 
the expansion of withholdingisation. TFFR observed that presumptive tax was “being 
charged on various types of income including profit on bank accounts and deposits; value 
of contracts and supplies; imports and exports; proceeds of bearer certificates; dividends; 
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on bonds, certificates or securities.”69 TFFR did engage into an apparently innocuous 
debate as regards oppressive implications of the presumptive regime, but then throwing 
the gauntlet on the tax administration, charge that it was because of CBR that switch-over 
from the fixed presumptive tax to adjustable withholding tax was not feasible.70 It was 
further posited that till the “time that the economy is completely documented and the 
income tax department is fully computerised duly backed by constant updating of soft-
ware for assessment and collection of direct taxes, the proposed switching over may be 
postponed.”71 TFFR also noted that extension of withholding scheme had “substantially 
curtailed the oft-spoken discretion of the assessing officers and brought to an end the 
complaints about discrimination in the matter of assessments,” and that this “has made 
the collection of tax easy and prompt and settled once for all the complaints against 
officials of the income tax department regarding malpractice associated with the issuance 
of refunds.”72 This was the most dangerous, self-defeating and self-contradictory 
narrative of the state’s revenue function that was built by none other than the very 
initiative that had been put in place to strengthen and capacitate it. The same narrative 
was then on-transmitted and propagated by a number of studies.73 This was 
withholdingisation at its crescendo but not quite—the worst was yet to come. 
The Task Force on Tax Reforms (TFFR), 2000, after observing that “income and 
corporate tax revenues have increased from 2 percent of the GDP in 1990-91 to 3.6 
percent of the GDP in 1999-2000,” held that the “two-percentage point increase in 
income tax (as a share of GDP) is largely attributed to an increase in withholding taxes,” 
which, in fact, accounted “for approximately 70 percent of total income tax revenue.”74 
At the turn of the century, out of the total withheld taxes, “about 54 percent were non-
adjustable or treated as final discharge of liability.”75 The TFTR went on to candidly 
remark that “within this category, some taxes, such as tax on dividends and on interest 
income, can properly be regarded as income taxes but there are several others, which are 
in the nature of export duties, import levies, turnover or other indirect taxes,” and that 
once adjustment had been made for these “indirect taxes,” the performance of the revenue 
agency became highly questionable.76 This was quite perfunctory analysis of the revenue 
drawing-board of the nation as TFTR was ignoring the simple fact that revenue was a 
zero-sum affair between the functional tax system and a withholdingised one in that if the 
charge had already been collected at the transaction stage, there would be no or nominal 
revenue left to be collected at the declaration stage or even at the audit (post-declaration) 
stage, and the shift there could not solely be ascribed to the revenue administration’s 
efficacy or effectiveness; this being the state’s deliberate choice to time collection of 
dues. After holding that “about 42 percent of the withholding taxes” were “in the nature 
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of indirect taxes,”77 TFFR should have gone on to make some suggestions to rein in the 
fast-sprouting withholdingisation; it instead, ended up proposing a few insignificant steps 
geared to strengthening the very process of withholdingisation. TFTR-proposed new-look 
tax system had “universal self-assessment, selective audit, functional specialisation, a 
centralised information system, strong audit capacity, survey and research capability, and 
taxpayer education and assistance programs,” as its main prongs, which would have 
expected to “increase voluntary compliance, improve the quality of tax audits, make tax 
audits fair and non-discriminatory, and strengthen the ability to detect and punish evasion 
and fraud.”78 However, what TFTR did not realise was perhaps that withholdingisation 
was like the tail-eating snake—once let loose it was to gulp the envisioned egalitarian tax 
system, howsoever, good it might be or wholesome. In fact, withholdingisation stood in-
between TFTR-contrived utopia and in reality fast panning out dystopia of a tax system. 
The Tax Reform Commission (TRC), 2016, succinctly observing that FBR was 
“collecting 95 percent of taxes by imposing more and more tax obligations on 
organisations and individuals in the form of withholding tax provisions,”79 viewed 
withholdingisation in a negative light chiefly for two reasons. First, it was reckoned that 
withholdingisation was per se spurious because, inter alia, it (a) had “reduced the tax base 
rather than realistically expanding it, eroding the administrative efficiency as against 
improving it;”80 (b) had obliterated “the concept of maintaining the full sets of books of 
accounts…from the taxpayer’s mind due to taxation of its gross receipts on Presumptive 
basis;” and (c) was “fraught with the possibilities of ultimately complicating the system 
more than simplifying it.”81 Second, withholdingisation has afforded the revenue 
administration an opportunity to “hide behind the façade of withholding taxes to show 
overall tax collection of their unit,” and that this misrepresented their “actual effort…in 
tax collections.”82 Against such a backdrop of avowed disapproval of withholdingisation 
in Pakistan, TRC, 2016 recommended developing a much-touted mechanism of 
“rationalisation of differential withholding taxes for compliant and non-compliant tax 
payers”83 initially in 2014. While TRC was proposing gradual phasing out of FTR, the 
polity resorting to an extensive use of withholdingisation as a tool of tax policy over the 
period that TRC was well in position, brought about a dozen new withholding provisions 
onto the tax code.  
It could be argued that states engage their societies, inter alia, in two important 
ways i.e. extractive engagement and distributive engagement. Distributive 
engagement is not only the most desired one sans any upper caps; but extractive 
engagement has strict principles and parameters. In Pakistan, the extractive 
engagement has not only been insufficient but also perverse and roguish, and its 
triggers and, at times, even its theoretical and ideological explanations, howsoever 
off-mark and misplaced, were supplied by various tax reform commissions and 
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committees were extensively used for surrogate insemination of elitist policy 
options.84 Even worst of tax policy prescriptions when processed through and 
stamped by a tax reform commission or committee, governments got them legislated 
and implemented with ease and without resistance.  Not surprisingly, as also shown 
in Figure 1, currently Pakistan has by far the widest withholding regime in the world. 
It could be observed that withholdingised extractive engagement between the citizen 
and the state effectively neutralises and dilutes the impact of the distributive 
engagement whatever little of it is undertaken by the latter.  
 
4.  WITHHOLDINGISATION—INFRASTRUCTURAL  
NUTS & BOLTS 
Given its multiple merits, at-source withholding of taxes is worldwide 
recognised as a legitimate and important source of fast-forwarding of revenue 
collection and to that extent it should be normal in Pakistan. However, in Pakistan 
withholding regime has been used as a source of revenue way too large in scale, size, 
scope and intensity. In addition to the preponing of tax collection on clearly 
demarcated chunks of revenue that, as per accepted accounting principles, have 
attained or are at the verge of attaining the character of income in the hands of the 
recipients, a large number of transactions were also brought into its nexus and then 
charged to tax by grossing up and presumptivising receipts as income—a 
withholdingisation of sorts. Withholdingisation, at a greater length, as already 
pointed out, refers to the process of wrapping of the entire economic system whereby 
at every single stage in the economic chain the state subtracts a part of the value of 
each transaction. Marginal subtraction of the value of each transaction—a part of it 
being picked by withholdee and part of it being passed on—when aggregate, inflate 
the end-value or price-tag of the goods and services produced in the economy. The 
elitist state’s mad rush into withholdingisation took a raw turn when towards the 
onset of the present century after perhaps reaching a saturation point in identification 
of any new incomes or transactions that could be slapped withholding taxes, started 
to tax transactions at both ends—first in DAS mode and then in CAS mode under two 
different provisions of the law. The number of transactions falling victim to dual -end 
withholdingisation is increasing every year. 
Since withholdingisation emanates from, is under-grid by, and lies in the 
trifurcation of tax system into Normal Tax Regime (NTR), Minimum Tax Regime 
(MTR), and Final Tax Regime (FTR), brief description of each would set the stage 
for the ensuing analysis and debate. NTR comprises standard set of rules and 
regulations whereby a taxpayer makes out a solemn declaration of his income or 
loss at a specified date in respect of a statutorily defined accounting period, 
whereupon the revenue administration, depending upon the operating procedures, 
and within the parameters of bounded rationality, either accepts the  declaration as 
such or frames its own assessment after investigations as it may consider 
necessary. The tax withheld at source on various counts is added up and after 
 
84Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed, “Elites, extraction, and state autonomy: Pakistan and U.S in 
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giving credit of the same, the resultant tax or refund is worked out and 
communicated to the taxpayer. MTR implies an arrangement put in place by the 
state whereby the tax withheld at source is considered a minimum tax liability in 
lieu of normal tax liability, if normal tax liability is less than the minimum tax 
liability. FTR, on the other hand, is based on the underlying principle of income-
presumptivisation of receipts which, in turn, originates from the legal fiction of 
deeming gross receipts as income and charging them to tax at a specific reduced 
rate.85 Under FTR withholding taxes deducted or collected at source, if done at the 
applicable rate, are adjusted against the total receipts deemed as income and the 
taxpayers’ tax affairs to the extent of that accounting period are considered 
finalised. A taxpayer fully covered under FTR does not necessarily need to have 
his accounts finalised, get them audited and file a comprehensive tax declaration. 
In fact, the treatment of withholding taxes is not only at the bottom of all three tax 
regimes, it is also their distinguishing feature.  
The transition of the system from withholding to withholdingisation—though slow 
yet steady—has been marked by the spread of tentacles of withholding regime 
aggressively grabbing more and more space of economic activity into its fold. Such an 
ingress of withholding scheme into the economic system was, inter alia, evidenced by an 
ever-increasing (i) number of withholding provisions in operation at any given time; (ii) 
tally of withholding agents; (iii) number of withholding provisions being legislated year 
after year; (iv) extension of withholding regime in FTR mode; (v) modification of 
withholding regime to admit of collection at source (CAS) as against deduction at source 
(DAS); (vi) application of withholding regime to transactions; (vii) share of withholding 
taxes’ share as a percentage of total tax revenues; (viii) compliance requirements for tax 
withholders; (ix) reporting requirements for tax withholders; (x) punitive implications for 
tax withholders; (xi) application of withholding regime at both ends; (xii) lopsided 
resource allocation for withholding monitoring operations.  
The foregoing variables when come into play with and reinforce eachother, cause 
to unleash an oppressive trigger that percolates from top to bottom and back in the 
economy resulting in massive negative fallouts for all economic agents, sectors and 
stakeholders except perhaps the state itself, which thrives on easy bucks—but only in the 
short run. In the long run, however, it is not only the active economic agents who suffer, 
but also the state and its underlying society, as the TRANSACTION gets shackled and 
gridlocked in a withholdingised economic system not only because of the withholdee’s 
unlimited choice to pass on the tax withheld but also because part of the tax so withheld 
gets stuck and reflected inside the price-tag of the final product. A brief analysis of 
factors of withholdingisation will help galvanise the debate and the thesis. 
  
4.1.  Withholding Provisions in Operation 
During its first one hundred years i.e. between 1860 and 1960 withholding tax 
regime faired quite conservatively admitting into its fold only three revenue sources, 
namely, Salary, Interest-on-Securities, and Dividend. Even Profit-on-Debt that otherwise 
 
85FTR replaced Presumptive Tax Regime (PTR) in the wake of promulgation of the Incoome Tax 
Ordinance, 2001. 
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had all the traits of income was not brought into the ambit of withholding net. Between 
1960 and 1990, when the economy industrialised, its revenue yielding capacity was 
punctured through wide-going exemptisation and repeated amnestisation. Pakistan being 
an expensive state to maintain, revenue needs were attempted to be met through an 
enhanced dependence on withholding taxes as not only Profit-on-Debt and Rent-on-
Property were placed under it, but also receipts from contract execution and supplies met 
the similar fate. Simultaneously, withholding regime for non-residents also expanded at a 
rapid pace. However, the real rot started towards the onset of the 1990s. This was also the 
time when democracy returned to Pakistan after a prolonged hiatus. The Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan almost diminished the US interest in the region and caused 
a decrease in opportunities of international rents for Pakistan. The resultant pressure for 
extraction from domestic sources needed to be deflected. The elites’ rational actor 
dilemma looked to resolve as modes of withholdingisation started to reproduce at an 
exorbitant pace.86  




Figure 1 depicts time series data of withholdingisation of Pakistan’s economy, that 
is, the number of withholding provisions being in operation at any given time. It may be 
noted that within the context of this study each withholding tax rate variation has been 
reckoned as a separate withholding provision. This is because each withholding tax rate 
variation represents an economic class or creates a new economic class or an economic 
interest group—denoting, by implication, some notches of added pressure on the polity in 
terms of lobbying or interest articulation for favourable “group taxation” policy options.  
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4.2.  Number of Withholding Agents 
Overtime, number of withholding agents has also steadily gone up. Unlike the 
initial 100 years of withholding regime when only the payers of Salary, Dividend and 
Interest-on-Securities were withholders, now practically in Pakistan every other 
participant in economic activity or transaction is a withholder. The time series data of 
withholding agents since 199587 is plotted in Figure 2, which shows that till about 2013 
the number of withholders with every passing year was increasing steadily, but then the 
line tends to straighten up around 2014 onwards. It implies that while new withholding 
provisions continued to be added to the code, the tally of withholders did not go up 
having reached a near-saturation point. It can safely be inferred that the same set of 
withholders were now implementing even a larger number of withholding provisions, 
deepening the oppressive impact of withholdingisation on its frontline victims. 
 




4.3.  Withholding Provisions Introduced 
Although, the primary purpose of the expansion of withholding regime as always 
claimed was to collect data of potential taxpayers and net them into the tax system, yet in 
reality, withholding has been used as a favourite tool of tax policy—particularly since 
mid-1970s. Figure 3 exhibits the number of withholding provisions promulgated each 
year and leads one to an irresistible conclusion that this prong of withholdingisation has 
been resorted to rather with vengeance since early 1990s. It conversely also means that 
while the polity remained adrift into withholdingisation, in the process, it continued to 
have the system weakened and incapacitated. 
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4.4.  Expansion of FTR  
With time the tally of withholding provisions being brought into the purview of 
FTR has been increasing by the year. What it plainly implies is that while the state is 
increasingly extricating itself from the process and effort of reaching out to the correct 
tax base on its citizens in a differentiated manner, in the process, it is de-capacitating its 
tax administration continually. 
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It is evident that there visibly exists a positive correlation between withholding 
tools being legislated on the taxing statute and expansion of FTR as portrayed in Figure 
4. Although, the number of withholding provisions under FTR is still less than that under 
NTR, yet the latter set of provisions also contains those extortionary legal tools where-
under the option of adjustment is available, but in actuality, the claims of adjustment of 
tax withheld are never or only negligibly filed. 
 
4.5.  Shuffle from DAS to CAS Mode  
Similarly, a homegrown innovation on the withholding regime has been to 
apply it to CAS mode as against DAS mode, which is an internationally accepted 
mechanism of preponing of government revenues. Data plotted in Figure 5 shows 
relative movement of CAS and DAS modes overtime. While even the total number of 
DAS points at 78 may be taken as too high in an international comparison, yet the 
fantastic number of 138 CAS points may be reckoned as a bizarre Pakistani 
exceptionalism. This may be taken as the key variable and expression of brute 
withholdingisation in Pakistan. 




4.6.  Withholdingisation of Transactions 
While application of withholding scheme to incomes has long history and wide 
coverage internationally, its application to transactions is not too common. Figure 6 
exhibits a consistent trend of upward increase in withholding regime’s application to the 
value of gross transactions at 182 as against 42 incomes. This coercive Chinacutting of 
transactions when aggregated at the national level turns to be of serious size and 
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4.7.  Withholding Share in Total Taxes 
The relative share of withholding taxes in the overall national tax take can be a 
meaningful gauge of how quickly and effectively the economy is falling into the shackles of 
withholdingisation. Data plotted in Figure 7 vividly reveals that continually share of tax 
collection through withholding has gone up. Likewise, the average rate of tax of deduction at 
source—particularly the one pertaining to transactions—execution of contracts, supplies, and 
imports—has also steadily moved up the ladder. This indicates the polity’s preference for and 
dependence on withholding mode and there too on taxation of gross transactions. It is 
apparent that such a perverse preference exercised under the pleasure principle effectively 
scuttled the continuum and aggregate of economic transactions—banking and real estate 
sectors being its vivid examples. 
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4.8.  Dual-end Withholding Taxes 
Although, the impact of dual-end withholdingisation on transactability in the 
economy—at least, in the recorded economy—is still to be systematically analysed and 
gauged, yet the same cannot be expected to be halcyon by any standard. Figure 8 is the 
graphic representation of dual-end withholdingisation simultaneously operating under 
DAS/CAS modes. Illustratively, while impact of withholding tax for a transaction in 
DAS mode is Rs. 10, but when the same transaction undergoes identical taxation also in 
CAS mode, the net impact gets doubled to Rs. 20, as reduced by each withholders’ ability 
to absorb the tax withheld by the other. Such aggressive taxation can have reverse-
multiplier effect on the economy. 
 
Fig. 8.  DAS/CAS Coupling Scenario 
 
 
4.9.  Withholders’ Compliance Requirements 
According to law, the tax collected or deducted is held by the withholder “in trust 
for the Federal Government,”88 and thereafter the same is “paid to the Commissioner” 
within seven days…in the manner” prescribed.89 It has been ordained that in case “a 
person fails to collect tax…or having collected…fails to pay the tax to the Commissioner 
as required under” law, he “shall be personally liable to pay the amount of tax to the 
commissioner.”90 Albeit the fact that in case “a person fails to collect tax as required 
under” the law, the Commissioner has the powers to “recover the amount not collected or 
deducted from the person from whom the tax should have been collected or to whom the 
payment was made,”91 yet it would “not absolve the person who failed to deduct 
tax…from any…legal action in relation to the failure, or from a charge of default 
surcharge or the disallowance of a deduction for the expense to which the failure 
relates.”92 The withholder is also duty-bound under the law to issue to the withholdee “a 
 
88Section 166(1)(a) of Pakistan, “The income tax ordinance, 2001,” (Islamabad: FBR, 2001). 
89Section 160 of ibid. 
90Section 161(1) of ibid. 
91Section 162(1) of ibid. 
92Section 162(2) of ibid. 
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certificate setting out the amount of tax collected or deducted and…other particulars.”93 
Still, to top all, a withholder has to be ready and brace for withholding monitoring audits 
for an indefinite period of time. One can spot a steady trend of increase in compliance 
compulsions for economic agents (withholders) over time surreptitiously rendering their 
operationalisation more and more difficult in a withholdingised economic system. 
 
4.10.  Withholders’ Reporting Requirements 
An identical trend can be spotted in the reporting regime for withholders. Having 
deducted and paid off the required amount of withholdable tax to national exchequer, the 
withholder is supposed to “furnish to the Commissioner a monthly statement in the 
prescribed form setting out” complete particulars about his own person, those of the 
withholdee, the transaction, and its payment to the treasury.94 It used to be an annual 
withholding reporting return which each withholder was obliged to furnish to the tax 
administration. Subsequently, it became a quarterly requirement in 1982, and it was not 
until 2011 that the submission of withholding statements was rendered a monthly 
requirement. The prescribed withholding statement requires of a withholder to fill in and 
supply a great amount of information apart from reproducing his entire cash book and 
bank book, which makes it quite a cost-intensive affair. Moreover, since withholding 
statements are to be furnished online, a withholder needs a substantial in-house capacity 
to timely meet the reporting requirements, which factor pushes the compliance cost for an 
enterprise further up. It will not be out of place to mention that withholders who happen 
to substantially contribute to the exchequer have been negotiating and getting selective 
reporting waivers e.g. banks in the case of interest-bearing depositors. But, in overall 
terms, the withholders’ reporting requirements have increased—including the 
withholding audits.  
 
4.11.   Withholders’ Punitive Regime  
Something that may have started as a regulatory vigilantism on the withholders 
towards the onset of the withholding regime has, with time, evolved into a full-blown 
parallel stream of taxation with its own operating coercive mechanisms duly supported by 
well laid down punitive and prosecutive implications. The minimum penal action that a 
withholder is subjected to in case of a default is that such “person shall be personally 
liable to pay the amount of tax to the Commissioner who may pass an order to that effect 
and proceed to recover the same.”95 Moreover, the defaulting withholder would pay 
“default surcharge at the rate of twelve percent per annum from the date he failed to 
collect or deduct the tax to the date the tax was paid.”96 Non-furnishing of monthly 
withholding statements calls for imposition of penalty at the rate of Rs. 2,500 per day 
(subject to a minimum penalty of Rs.10,000).97  
The icing on the cake comes in the shape of prosecutive implications as the law 
stipulates that “Any person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to…comply with the 
 
93Section 164(1) of ibid. 
94Section 165(1) of ibid. 
95Section 161(1) of ibid. 
96Section 161(1B) of ibid. 
97Section 182(1)(Table Sl.1A) of ibid. 
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obligation…to collect or deduct tax and pay the tax to the Commissioner,…shall commit 
an offense punishable on conviction with a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
one year, or both.”98 Yet another highly penalising implication for withholders comes in 
the form of a stipulation that “no deduction shall be allowed in computing the income of 
a person…for…any expenditure from which the person is required to deduct or collect 
tax…, unless the person has paid or deducted and paid the tax as required by” law.99 The 
imposition of penalty for non-filing of withholding statements has of late become a major 
preoccupation of the revenue administration. Illustratively, only during May and June, 
2017, DC, IRS, Cantonments, Rawalpindi, imposed a penalty of Rs. 1.3 billion for non-
filing of monthly withholding statements. Likewise, AC, IRS, exercising jurisdiction over 
Rawalpindi City, levied a penalty of over Rs. 2 billion on non-filers of monthly 
withholding statements. The amount of penalty so imposed far outweighed the total tax 
imposed under the normal law by the entire Regional Tax Office, Rawalpindi. 
Accordingly, pending appellate cases at given point in time resulting from the imposition 
of penalty for default of withholding taxes far outnumber those under the normal regime.  
 
4.12.  Resource Allocation for Withholding Regime 
Betraying the polity’s pronounced preference for withholdingisation of economic 
system at the expense of capacitation of the tax system, a corresponding historical shift in 
resource allocation from the latter to the former can be spotted—particularly since 1991. 
The narrative used for the purpose was “effective monitoring” of withholding taxes. During 
1990s, the focus of tax administration increasingly shifted from normal taxation to 
withholding taxation as revenue numbers began to avail primacy over how they were being 
generated. In this sense of the matter, the polity reflected the society and its mores to look at 
private wealth and its means. A specialised Directorate General (Withholding Taxes) was 
created in 2001, which intensified the process of withholdingisation. About two dozen 
specialised Commissionerates (Withholding Taxes) were established in February 2013 all 
over the country—with maximum resources—both in men and means—being placed at 
their disposal. In fact, withholdingisation of the system has occurred at such a rattling pace 
that FBR in routine has started to pick up sundry procurement and tender notices published 
in various newspapers, caption them as “Real Time Proactive Monitoring of Withholding 
Taxes,” and circulate them to field formations prospectively stipulating “that all due taxes, 
in these procurements, as and when became due, are properly withheld (as per law) and 
timely deposited (as per procedure).”100 One wonders if FBR also ever collects information 
on massive money laundering ploys, illegal remittances, beneficial transactions and cases of 
mega tax evasion and shares it with field collectors for proper adjudication. Since bulk of 
the revenue comes from withholding, understandably maximum resources in each tax 
organisation tend to be allocated for monitoring and collection of withholding taxes leaving 
normal taxation to backburner, sapped, and stunted. Thus, it is not astonishing that the best 
human resource and maximum means get allocated for withholding function at the expense 
of normal taxation. 
 
98Section 191(1)(c) of ibid. 
99Section 21(c) of ibid. 
100FBR’s Memorandum No.7(73)C(WHTM-)/2017/5983-R, dated June 15, 2017. 
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Since the premise is that withholdingisation is essentially an elitist enterprise, it 
would be an interesting question to pose as to how do elites then wriggle out of its 
concomitant adverse fallouts—for instance, excessive-deductions. The paper posits that 
elites have both pre- and post-withholding escape clauses kept available to themselves. In 
the pre-withholding domain the elites have exemptisation that they resort to as and when 
required, which is of two types i.e. general exemptisation and specific exemptisation. 
General exemptisation refers to exempting provisions that are brought to bear down on 
the tax system through both legislative and bureaucratic processes e.g. Statutory Relief 
Orders (SROs). Specific exemptions are issued by Commissioners on request. In the post-
withholdingisation scenario, elites resort to exercise of political muscle to get their 
refunds cleared.101 In case of non-sanctioning of exemption requests and refunds, elites 
resort to invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution with substantial 
degree of receptivity. Elites Ltd has also put in place Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO)—
an institution that is effectively utilised to get their refunds of all shades and hues 
processed. It can be argued that excessive deductions also serve some other purposes. 
First, the government gets free funds to finance its operations. Second, “getting a tax 
refund fosters the notion that the government is benevolent.”102 Many a times over the 
recent past, at especially arranged functions, Prime Minister, Finance Minister, and 
Chairman, FBR, have been seen bestowing upon citizens refund cheques that anyway 
legitimately belonged to them. Thirdly, the elitist state uses excessive deductions as 
bargaining chip while negotiating settlements with various interest groups. Lastly, 
excessive deduction creates opportunities for convenient rent-seeking. In a 
withholdingised economic system, elites also resort to amnestisation as an effective tool 
of advancing their economic agenda. In addition to the above strands which converge on 
the point that Pakistan’s polity, under the preponderant impress of the pleasure principle, 
systemically withholdingised the tax system which steadily took the entire economic 
system into its shackles.  
The oppressive implication of withholdingisation was further accentuated by 
other unconnected but related measures e.g. a robust withholding regime being put in 
place under sales tax in 2007.103 Likewise, in early 2010s, when provinces 
established their own independent revenue agencies in the wake of 18 th amendment 
to the Constitution, withholding of sales tax was enforced as the central pivot of the 
provincial revenue systems. Similarly, an upfront Infrastructure Cess on all imports 
and exports by land or sea was imposed by Sindh with other provinces constantly 
looking to tap new sources of easy and quick revenues. If all that was not enough, the 
state opted to fix some of its other malaise (that had nothing to do with taxation or 
tax system per se) through withholdingisation e.g. T.V. Surcharge, Neelam Jehlum 
Surcharge, and compulsive contributions from employees’ salaries at the time of 
natural calamities.104 
 
101Ahmed, “Pakistan: Extraction, elites and state autonomy: A theoretical configuration.” 
102Lawrence M. Vance, “The Curse of Withholding Taxes,”  Mises institute: Mises daily articles 
(2005), https://mises.org/library/curse-withholding-tax. 
103The Sales Tax (Special Procedure) Rules, 2007, enforced vide SRO, 660, of 2007. 
104See, for a detailed analysis, Ahmed, “Pakistan: Extraction, elites and state autonomy: A theoretical 
configuration.” 
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5.  WITHHOLDINGISATION & NATIONAL  
TAX COLLECTION COST 
Withholdingisation, inter alia, achieves a couple of distinct objectives of the elitist 
state. One, it helps underfinance the revenue administration, which as a result thereof gets 
incapacitated over time and weak enough to pose taxing questions. It has been argued that 
Elites Ltd’s control “on the revenue function helps the former keep the latter under-financed 
and, thus stunted, and constrained on its operations.”105 It thus is not astonishing that against 
the world-average of 2.5 percent, Pakistan’s tax collection cost is 0.73 percent, which when 
further divided between IRS and PCS works out at 0.23 percent for the former—the agency 
which is exclusively responsible to conduct state’s inland extractive operations and collect 
good about 90 percent of its total tax revenues.106 It has also been observed that “such was not 
the scenario at the time of independence when the colonial state allocated full required amount 
of resources to its extractive arm so as to undertake optimal revenue generation,” as there is 
evidence to suggest that it was only after independence that “post-colonial elitist state had 
started to cut on its revenue function’s expenditure.”107 Vakil, as far back as 1950, had 
commented that “the cost of collection of various taxes,” in “proportion to total revenue in 
India is higher than that in Pakistan.”108 Likewise, TEC had observed in 1960 that for “the 
Central Government the cost of collection of taxes is roughly 3 percent,” and as a “proportion 
of total expenditure, the cost of collection of taxes has declined from 3.77 percent in 1949-50 
to 3.12 percent in 1957-58,”109 to adequately establish that “corrosive degenerative process 
that had seemingly taken roots by then—finally bringing it down to such ridiculously low 
levels as at present.”110 NTRC after observing that “the cost of collection of taxes has been 
kept below one percent of the total revenue collected which compares favourably with the 
cost of collection not only in the developing countries but also with the developed world,” 
harangued that “this has been achieved at the cost of ignoring certain basic elements necessary 
in a sophisticated taxation system.111 It is not that a sane voice has never been raised; there 
have been, but those were completely ignored. CTR noting that the “cost of collection (in 
respect of Sales Tax) went down from 0.71 percent in 1986-87 to 0.62 percent during 1988-
89,”112  argued “that expenditure of CBR should be treated as development expenditure, and 
that it be allowed to spend a fixed percentage of revenues collected.”113 Similarly, it was 
suggested that the present level of CBR’s expenditure should be raised by 0.5 percent of 
revenue collected and also that it should be given complete financial autonomy.114 The elitist 
state’s response, however, has been more and more withholdingisation thereby keeping the 
revenue system incapacitated and cost of collection transferred to citizens. 
 
105See Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Governance goliath: The case of non-professional Chairman, F.B.R,” 30. 
106These estimates are based on the actual budgetary allocations made by the Goverment of Pakistan to 
FBR and its various departments. 
107Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Governance Goliath: The Case of Non-Professional Chairman, F.B.R,” 30. 
108C. N. Vakil, Economic consequences of divided India; a study of the economy of India and Pakistan  
(Bombay: Vora, 1950). 
109GOP, “The taxation enquiry committee report (Volume 1) “ 24. 
110Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Governance goliath: The case of non-professional Chairman, F.B.R,” 30. 
111GOP, “The national taxation reform commission report (Part 1),” 325. 
112GOP, “The committee on tax reforms report,” D2. 
113Ibid., B46. 
114Ibid. 
496 Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed 
Two, the elitist state conveniently shifts (outsources) its fiscal function to private 
entrepreneurs—by directly cutting on the cost of collection of taxes. But is it really so? 
Probably, it cannot be; and it is not. In 2016-17, Pakistan saw its position sliding down to 
85th in terms of “effects of taxation on incentives to invest” from 66th in 2015-16.115 
Moreover, Pakistani entrepreneurs pick exceptionally higher compliance costs vis-à-vis 
tax administration. Is it just because of the standard tax filing of routine nature? Perhaps 
not; much of it is because of withholdingisation of economic system and what it means to 
an entrepreneur being a withholder. No doubt, sparse grievances are aired by various 
economic agents suggesting that cost of withholding taxes was becoming unbearable for 
the private business. But it is yet to be systematically posited that, in fact, what the state 
had done was, it had tactfully contracted out its extractive function, and that if the official 
cost of collection was on lower side, it was due to the deft cost shifting by the state to the 
entrepreneur. In Pakistan’s context official cost of collection was markedly different from 
the national cost of collection, which, in addition to the official cost of collection, also 
included the cost of withholding—borne by private entrepreneurs. Thus, Pakistan’s tax 
collection cost may be notationally written as under: 
X = W + Y 
X = Z 
While X represents standard tax collection cost; W represents official tax collection cost 
(picked by the state); Y represents withholding tax collection cost (picked by the 
entrepreneur); and Z represents national tax collection cost (picked both by the state and the 
society); hence dubbed as national tax collection cost. An empirically-based approximation 
of national tax collection cost being outside the purview of the present study, yet what can 
hypothetically be stated is that, all put together, Pakistan’s national tax collection may be 
between 3.5-4 percent—probably highest in the world. Now if the developing countries 
average of 2 percent is taken as an acceptable measure of tax collection cost, the excess 
being spent by Pakistani society between 1.5-2.0 percent could be dubbed as national 
deadweight loss. This amount, if saved through capacitation of the tax system, could easily 
be diverted to better the service delivery and improve state’s performance in other functions 
like coercive, regulative, and distributive, apart from arresting withholdingisation-induced 
anarchy, and neutralising its Dutch Disease effects on the economy. 
 
5.1.  Taxflation 
Now, the exaggerated cost of collection as worked out above that both the 
economy and the society are compulsively made to suffer on account of 
withholdingisation can be analysed within the context of how it actually plays out with 
prices of goods and services transacted in the market. It is stipulated that 
withholdingisation being applicable at each meeting-point in the transaction chain 
cumulatively enhances the end-price of goods and services being produced in the 
economy—triggering a process that could operationally be dubbed as taxflation—




116“Taxflation” has been used in the paper in a sense slightly different from the one that is generally 
associated with it whereby an inflation-related increase in income pushes its recipent into higher applicable tax 
brackets off-setting the impact of increase in income - something also known as “bracket-creep.” 
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adjusted nor refunded.117 While on the one hand, such aggressive extortionist taxation 
contributes to taxflation owning to its inherent ability to get passed on, on the other, it 
tinkers with equity and efficiency principles, and adds to social anarchy and chaos. 
Taxflation, when disaggregated, can be notationally written as under: 
TF = CC + WHT1 + WHT2 + WHT3 + LL + VAT 
In the equation, while TF denotes taxflation; CC exaggerated compliance cost in a 
withholdingised economic system; WHT1 withholding tax deducted on intermediary inputs 
stuck in the final output prices; WHT2 withholding tax applied in CAS mode and likely to 
be added to the price; WHT3 fixed cost paddings like withholding tax on building rent, and 
utilities e.g. electricity, gas and telephone that the supplier has to pass on; LL line-losses 
like withholding tax on banking and other transactions; and VAT represents the federal and 
provincial sales tax or its variants, which are an inevitable additionality to the final price of 
goods and services transacted and produced in the economy. 
 
5.2.  Perverse Quid Pro Quo 
This tax collection cost sharing arrangement between the contractor (state) and the 
contractee (withholder) may have under-grid a larger perverse quid pro quo in the 
economy. Entrepreneurs, as withholdingisation expanded its tentacles on the economic 
system, made adjustments to their business systems, in the process internalising the 
withholding tax collection costs into their pricing structure—both upstream and 
downstream. The entrepreneurs picking up these additional withholding collection costs 
were duly compensated and rewarded by the state in the form of recurrent amnestisation, 
general and specific exemptisation, generous audit waivers, deterrence-free self-
assessment regimes, relaxation in information declarations, and diluted regulatory and 
oversight frameworks—even bordering on keeping the tax collectors at bay. In fact, 
Pakistani entrepreneurs may have quite happily picked up the withholding tax collection 
cost.  This lowly, perverse, and degenerative arrangement between the state and the 
society realises a tax system that effectively undertakes undifferentiated, extortionist, and 
unequal extraction in a society wherein economic resources are already highly unevenly 
dispersed. In this sense of the matter, withholdingisation may have operated as an 
effective pull-back factor on the forward march of the society, the state, and a bonding 
between the two that continues to be thread-thin at any rate.118  
 
6.  WITHHOLDINGISATION OUTCOMES 
While the preceding sections argued and established that Pakistan tax system had 
been thoroughly withholdingised as evidenced by a dozen of its underlying prongs, this 
section ventures to normatively analyse, in the succeeding three sub-parts, if its output—
collection of easy bucks—has had a wholesome outcomes and impacts on the polity; if it 
caused or contributed towards an ever-increasing disruption in the society; and if it 
generated an adverse impact on the economy closer to that of Dutch Disease? What could 
 
117This is because, theoretically speaking, all direct taxes are supposed to be borne by the payer of the 
tax himself. 
118Ahmed, “Pakistan: State-building, extraction, and (misplaced) societal preferences.” 
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be predicted upfront is that the state’s blindly pursuing the pleasure principle at the 
expense of the reality principle was bound to have consequences; and looks like chickens 
have come home to roost.  
 
6.1.  Source of Revenue? 
It is abundantly clear, as also depicted in Figure 7, that withholding taxes’ 
contribution which was about 45 percent of total direct tax revenue starts to shoot up at 
the start of 1990s; this was due to the introduction of PTR. The contribution of 
withholding taxes consistently kept climbing up till it touched its historic highest in 1996-
97;119 then steadied at around 60 percent. The curve again starts to get steeper at the start 
of 2010s and touches 70 percent mark before again slightly declining at around 2014-15, 
which decline is really difficult to explain.120 Is it fatigue of the withholder with the 
coercive outsourcing of the extractive function or fudging of facts on part of the state to 
make the numbers look acceptable enough to form a reasonable basis for further 
international extraction? It is reiterated that the exaggerated contribution of a 
withholdingised extractive system is unwholesome with far-reaching adverse fallouts for 
the state to extract from other sources. In the succeeding paragraphs some of the systemic 
fallouts will be explained. 
Firstly, tax system’s uprooting from its normative foundations may be one of the 
most carcinogenic effects that withholdingisation has had on the state and its extractive 
operations.121 Adam Smith normatively desired to base a tax system on (a) equity—
fairness in regard to relative tax burden borne by various segments of society; (b) 
certainty—assurances against arbitrariness in regard to the procedure of working out of 
tax liability and the timing of its discharge; (c) convenience—with regard to the mode, 
manner and the timing of tax defrayment; and (d) efficiency—deriving maximum output 
from the input supplied, that is, cost of collection, and with minimum negative 
externalities.122 Although, this classical prescriptive model of a tax system has ruled the 
roost for centuries, yet a couple of more attributes may also be desirably added, namely, 
is the tax system good enough to extract at a sufficiently required level, and if the tax 
system, in overall terms, adds to the process of state-building or undermines it? A 
compulsive cynic may, however, retort that if a given tax system has all four Smithsonian 
attributes, should it not be assumed that it also has inbuilt the two aforementioned 
 
119This can, inter alia, be explained in terms of the prevailing political uncertainity that brought the 
nromal revenue operations to a perceptible slow down. 
120It may be pertinent to point out that if at-source deduction of sales tax is also added to the equation, 
the impact of withholdingisation on the eocnomy would appear even intenser.  
121Mahnaz Fatima and Q. Masood Ahmed, “Political economy of fiscal reforms in the 1990s,” The 
Pakistan Development Review 40, no. 4 (2001); Ahmed, “Pakistan’s governance goliath: The case of non-
professional Chairman, F.B.R.”; Ahmed, “Pakistan: State-building, extraction, and (misplaced) societal 
preferences.”; Ahmed, “Pakistan: Extraction, elites and state autonomy: A theoretical configuration.”; Pasha, 
“Political economy of tax reforms: The Pakistan experience.”; Hafiz A. Pasha & Aisha Ghaus-Pasha, “The 
future path of tax reforms in Pakistan,” in Pakistan: Moving the Economy Forward, ed. Rashid Amjad & 
Shahid Javed Burki (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Musharraf R. Cyan and Jorge Martinez-
Vazquez, “Pakistan’s enduring agenda for tax reforms,” in The role of taxation in Pakistan’s revival, ed. Jorge 
Martinez-Vazquez and Musharraf R. Cyan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
122Adam Smith, The wealth of nations, ed. C. J. Bullock, vol. X, The Harvard Classics (New York: P.F. 
Collier & Son, 1909-14). 
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additional traits. “Yes” and “no.” The paper stipulates that a tax system howsoever 
utopian in its outlook, if it does not collect revenues enough to maintain the state, it is not 
a good tax system as the state under compulsion would have to resort to other sources of 
extraction with adverse implications in the long-run, which scenario reinforces the 
sufficiency and state-building attributes into the equation.  
Like the debate on equity is central to the debate on a tax system, the debate on tax 
incidence is central to a debate on equity. Equity is of two types i.e. horizontal equity and 
vertical equity. While horizontal equity asserts that there ought to be “equal treatment of 
equals,” that is, individuals enjoying identical wealth, or in identical income brackets, 
must suffer equal tax impact, vertical equity canon stipulates that wealthier persons and 
those in possession of larger economic resources must pick larger tax incidence. David 
Elkins argues that “violation of horizontal equity, while not necessarily fatal, is 
nevertheless considered a fatal flaw in any…tax arrangement.”123 Tax rates that underlie 
equity principle can be of three types, namely, progressive, regressive or proportional. In 
case, the effective tax rate increases as income increases, the overall tax system would be 
considered as progressive; in case, the tax rate decreases with income, the tax system 
would be regressive; and finally, if it remains constant, it is a proportional tax system. 
The most important concept inside equity debate may be that of tax incidence, which is of 
two types i.e. statutory incidence and economic incidence. While statutory incidence of 
tax indicates who is legally responsible for the tax, economic incidence of a tax is the 
change in the distribution of private real income induced by a tax. The mechanism 
through which statutory incidence of a tax is transferred from those who are legally 
responsible to collect to those who actually bear the economic burden is dubbed as “tax 
shifting.” In case, the tax is shifted to consumers through higher prices of goods and 
services, the tax is said to be “shifted forward;” if the tax is borne instead by workers or 
other input suppliers, then the tax is said to be “shifted backward.” Wahid & Wallace 
undertook an enlightened empirical study on Pakistan, which despite limitations and 
shaky assumptions, held that “two most important sources of horizontal inequities are the 
unequal treatment of different taxpayers through exemptions and tax evasions.”124 
Without touching upon vertical equity, which may perhaps be a bigger bane in Pakistan’s 
context, they go on to controversially hold that “while all households bear part of the 
burden of taxes in Pakistan, the higher income households bear a larger share of the 
burden than low-income households.”125 They also adjudge that “direct taxes have a 
much more progressive distributions,” which may be “due to the high threshold for the 
individual income tax and the concentration of capital income in the higher income 
groups.”126 They end up making highly provocative statement that “the system of direct 
taxes in Pakistan is very progressive at the top income end.”127  
 
123David Elkins, “Horizontal equity as a principle of tax theory,” Yale Law & Policy Review 24, no. 1 
(2006). 
124Umar Wahid and Sally Wallace, “The equity debate in tax policy,” in The Role of Taxation in 
Pakistan’s Revival, ed. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Musharraf Rasool Cyan (Oxford University Press: 
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These rather positive summations come against the general perception that 
Pakistan tax system having been excessively withholdingised is highly lopsided. 
Theoretically speaking, progressivity—the ability to extract from people according to per 
their capacity, becomes the first casualty of withholdingisation. Tax system’s 
surreptitious indirectisation through withholdingisation, as already also pointed out, has 
been done and achieved on purpose. Haq pertinently remarked that “determination of a 
tax base capable of measuring an individual’s ability-to-pay is a major problem of our tax 
system,” since elsewhere “this rule is achieved by adopting progressive rate schedule for 
personal income tax and property tax,” but “we have moved from this policy to unequal 
sacrificial rule where the mighty…political elite are paying meager taxes and actual 
incidence is shifted to the less-privileged.”128 He goes on to state that “businessmen are 
offered presumptive tax regime, even under income tax law, to pass on burden on the 
customers,” whereas “masses are overburdened with oppressive indirect taxes, ever rising 
costs of public utilities and petroleum products.”129 
Secondly, sustained ruthless withholdingisation has effectively neutralised and 
disengaged the tax system from the overall macroeconomic framework. 
Government’s role in the economic domain has broadly been seen in terms of (a) 
overcoming inefficiencies of market system and allocation of economic resources;  
(b) reordering of distribution of income and wealth in the society along “just” and 
“equitable” lines; and (c) smoothing out of cyclical economic fluctuations with a 
view to ensuring employment and inflation rates at desired levels.130 One of the 
prime harms that withholdingisation may have done is neutralisation of tax policy as 
an effective tool of macroeconomic management. A standard Keynesian stipulation is 
that through an effective utilisation of fiscal policy, aggregate demand levels can be 
increased or decreased while balancing the act between unemployment and inflation. 
In Pakistan’s case withholdingisation has defanged tax policy as a mechanism of 
tinkering with macroeconomic management. In a withholdingised economic system 
the standard tool of reduction in tax rates cannot be expected to increase output 
through raising the aggregate demand, as the actual tax rate is diluted into hundreds 
of tax rates applicable to sectors, sub-sectors and even single business lines.131 
Withholdingisation may have also neutralised taxation as a reliable tool of 
conducting social policy. Historically, taxation has been used to encourage home 
ownership, investment, family formation, and even environmental protection. In 
Pakistan, of late, tax policy has become synonymous with and confined to fine-
tuning of withholding tax provisions, rates, and operational mechanisms. Likewise, 
withholdingisation may have also negatively impacted economic development in not 
 
128Ikramul Haq, “Undoing unjust tax system,” Daily Times, June 4, 2017. 
129Ibid. 
130R. A. Musgrave, The theory of public finance  (London: McGraw-Hill, 1959); Ahmed, “Pakistan: 
state-building, extraction, and (misplaced) societal preferences.”; Ahmed, “Pakistan’s governance goliath: The 
case of non-professional Chairman, F.B.R.”; Wahid and Wallace, “The equity debate in tax policy.”; Jorge 
Martinez-Vazquez and Kaspar Richter, “Pakistan’s short and medium term reform options,” in The role of 
taxation in Pakistan’s revival, ed. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Musharraf Rasool Cyan (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
131Excessive withholdingisation, it has been argued, can also cause, incentivise and increase 
sumuggling. 
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too-well-known but important ways. It was observed that imposition of withholding 
tax on banking transactions “resulted in the slowdown of bank deposit growth, and 
forced medium- and small-sized banks to offer returns above the market rates to raise 
deposits.”132 In Pakistan where rates of savings and investment are already much 
below the desired threshold, such negative latent policy biases are bound to adversely 
affect economic growth and development. 
Thirdly, withholdingisation may have created more economic distortions than 
generally ascribed to it. When withholding regime started to expand in Pakistan during 
1980s and 1990s, one of the major advantages, at least for public consumption, was 
reckoned to be data collection about potential taxpayers so they could be roped into tax 
net. However, the current levels of withholdingisation have started to produce 
diametrically opposite results. Illustratively, SBP in reference to the imposition of 
withholding tax on bank deposits, in 2016, observed that “withholding tax on deposits is 
halting the deepening of the banking services,” and that the same was “acting against the 
goal of achieving financial depth,” and further that “for the first time since 2009-10 the 
monetary expansion came more from currency in circulation than the bank deposit 
growth,” as “private sector deposits increased by Rs.149.4 billion during July-March 
FY16 — less than half of the rise recorded during the corresponding period of FY15.”133 
In the same vein, business community “also tried to find other modes of payment to avoid 
it,” and “particularly retailers and medium-sized businesses, started using dollars to make 
payments while they kept dollars in their bank lockers.”134 Resultantly, surplus liquid 
funds either flee the country or get invested in the real estate—a dead sector for all 
practical purposes.135 It is also commonly believed that excessive application of 
withholding taxes on the real estate sector has significantly brought down the number of 
transactions therein causing a definite dent in the aggregate revenue. Thus, Pakistan’s 
official savings rate staying stagnant around 16 percent may also partly be explained in 
terms of brute withholdingisation of the economic system.  
Fourthly, withholdingisation has rendered much of the fiscal system 
unreformable.  This can be seen from five different standpoints. One, the entire tax 
administration—IT systems, underlying rules and procedures, the human resource—
and even the Parliament, have all adjusted to at-source mode and methodology of 
revenue-collection within their respective roles. Two, because of the ever-emerging 
special regimes, the tax statute has gotten more and more complex and complicated 
with every year passing particularly since 1991 onwards. Three, the case law that has 
developed over the past three decades having been cast in the same dye, has 
significantly added to the complexity of the system rendering it more and more 
unreformable. Four, the state’s overdependence on at-source taxation leaves little 
room for successive governments to undertake any risky and meaningful reforms in 
 




135This may be reckoned as dead sector as any investement in real estate, inter alia, does not create jobs; 
does not generate substantial amount of revenues through taxaton of gains resulting from its appreciation over 
time, and creates bubble crowding genuine buyers out of the market causing slow down in the construction 
industry - and directly and indirectly associated industries and sectors.  
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that no government finds itself in a position to let go of sure easy bucks into the 
kitty. “The necessary work to address these contortions and the costs of tax revenues  
likely to be lost during such a transition,” it has been averred, “will now need three to 
four budget cycles to carry out.”136 Last, the system due to relentless retrofitting over 
the past three decades has gone beyond a repairable condition—an “entrenchment” of 
sorts; in that withholdingisation operates as the “Superstatue”—an inescapable 
reality. 
Fifthly, withholdingisation has also triggered heightened interest group activity in 
the country. Elsewhere elaborated also, heightened groupnessisation has taken the entire 
public policy formulation process into its shackles. In fact, interest group activity has 
attained such a pace that it is beginning to have a rattling effect on the polity. Trade 
unionisation of the economy, when above-normal, creates distortions and produces 
substantial negative externalities. An interest group gets formed and rolled out as soon as 
another group has gotten its withholding rate or regime favourably adjusted. It goes 
without saying that an economic group operates as a rational actor readying to optimise 
on any opportunities to safeguard and promote their particularistic interests. In a 
withholdingised economy, when the interest groups also contribute to the exchequer 
substantially, their voice proportionately becomes more vibrant and audible. In fact, in 
T/Y 2016, while banking sector “paid total taxes of over Rs. 140 billion,” it “collected 
and paid to FBR over Rs. 134 billion as withholding tax.”137 Not surprisingly then the 
sector got away with significant relaxations on their reporting requirements in quid pro 
quo from the state.  
Lastly, since by their very nature, withholding taxes happen to be indiscriminate in 
target and impact, they tend to nudge and hurt marginalised segments of society rather 
seriously. Although “vulnerable groups such as widows, pensioners, retirees, students 
etc., receive very low compensation or income that falls below the taxable threshold 
and…are not liable to pay tax,” yet “withholding tax is deducted on their savings 
whenever they make withdrawals, which is unfair as they cannot claim credit for the 
deducted amount.”138 The state which is already failing on its functions in terms of 
providing necessary public goods like education and health to its citizens must be doubly 
cognizant of citizen groups that statutorily are not to be taxed—short of that state-society 
relations would be as weak as in the present-day Pakistan. Further, such deductive 
extortions from the impoverished or not well-to-do citizens pushes them away from 
financial inclusion process effectively barring them from economic mainstreaming.139  
In all fairness, withholdingisation apparently may have added an element of 
certainty to the tax system, but it is essentially artificial in that, in the long run, it is 
not sustainable being unjust, arbitrary, and perverse. Withholdingisation also betrays 
sham convenience as if both the withholder and the withholdee are over with tax 
component of doing business, but in reality it has complicated the system as can be 
seen from the ever-increasing compliance and reporting requirements, and the 
stringency of the punitive and prosecutive regimes for withholders. There is no doubt 
 
136Shahid Kardar, “Amplified policy distortions,” Dawn, July 4, 2017. 
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that in Pakistan an entrepreneur allocates a substantially high number of man-hours 
to comply with tax system’s requirements, which really dislodges both the 
convenience and efficiency arguments in support of withholdingisation. Summing up, 
it may, however, be that withholdingisation has done well by maintaining a tax/GDP 
ratio of under or around 10 percent but in the process, it could have done more harm 
than good to the economy, the society, and the polity at a deeper and wider level; a 
better understanding of which would continue to be gained by all three in the years 
and decades to come.  
 
6.2.  Source of Civil Strife? 
Ron Cruse’s observation that many of the countries that he “visited in the late 
1980s were veritable incubators of repression, civil strife, and war,” but Pakistan was 
the place “where violence was a part of daily life,” holds water even today.140 
Pakistan historically has been in the throes of civil strife of varying shades and hues 
starting with the independence-time mass-migration (and its aftermath) to linguistic, 
ethnic, sectarian, regional, and ideological civil strife. Not that all these causes have 
been neutralised or that economically-oriented civil strife did not exist earlier but 
lately economic civil strife appears to have overtaken as the most abundant and 
powerful source of civil strife in Pakistan. People have, of late, protested on roads 
and gone violent, killed, pelted stones, burnt private properties, fired, staged sit -ins, 
splayed deadbodies refusing burials, resorted to hunger strikes, carried-out mock 
hangings to articulate their demands; express their angst; exhibit their powerlessness. 
The state has responded to the protests and protestors with killings, lathi charges, 
arrests, lay-offs, tear-gassing, wickedly negotiations, but rarely with robust and solid 
policy interventions. Protests, in turn, more topically, have sprung against 
joblessness, unfavourable job conditions, load-shedding,141 perceived grievances of 
exclusion (say, under CPEC),142 unscheduled power failures and outages, drone 
attacks, ethnically-oriented cleansing, honor-killings, media clamp-down, perceived 
unfavourable fiscal, agricultural, religious, export and other policies. But at some 
level, the social anomie has deeper roots and appears stemming from governance 
structures that produce, sustain and promote massively iniquitous and unjust socio -
economic order. 
Although economic civil strife started to make manifestations over the past couple 
of decades, yet it had its seeds sown in the very way the state structure was contrived 
during initial phase of its establishment. Groupnessisation along pecuniary lines, riot 
politics, agitational demand articulation, exploitation of violence as a means of pursuing 
objectives, and commercialisation of politics may be the most important manifestations 
of economic civil strife. There is hardly any disagreement as to its causes, which include 
widespread economic injustice, concentration of national economic resources in few 
 
140R. Cruse, Lies, Bribes & Peril: Lessons for the real challenges of international business  (Universe, 
2008). 47. 
141Hassan Farhan, “One dead as protests against loadsheding turn violent in K.P,” Dawn, May 29, 
2017. 
142Imtiaz Ali Taj, “Thousands protest government’s negligence of Gilgit Baltistan under CPEC,” Dawn, 
May 15, 2017. 
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hands, state’s structural faultlines that have pro-rich in-built bias, extant political 
settlement that is out of sync with the operating realities—and, of late, 
withholdingisation. Withholdingisation breeds groupnessisation in that it creates new 
economic identities and groups, reactivates the ones gone into hibernation, and 
resuscitates the dead ones by prompting them an economic threat or splaying before them 
an economic opportunity vis-à-vis another economic group. A withholdingised economic 
system is bound to brace for hyper group activity where economic agents get unleashed 
to haggle with other interest groups. In order to analyse withholdingisation and study its 
actual oppressive implications for the system, the paper draws upon Colin H. Kahl’s 
theory of Demographic and Environmental Stress (DES), and modifies it to fit the 
topical, the temporal and the spatial.143 
The theory of DES stipulates that demographic and environmental stress can bear 
down significant amount of pressure on societies and polities in the developing world 
and, over time, test their harmony, robustness and survivability.144 To Kahl “ecological, 
economic, and social effects, population and environmental pressures reverberate into 
politics” and potentially produce two pathways to civil strife i.e. state failure and state 
exploitation.”145 It follows that “state failure conflicts occur when DES substantially 
weakens state authority,” whereby the state’s conventional monopoly over violence gets 
diluted and shared with non-state actors “increasing the opportunities and incentives for 
anti-state and intergroup violence via the logic of the security dilemma.”146 On the other 
hand “State exploitation conflicts…occur when threatened state elites seize on natural 
resource scarcities and related social grievances to instigate conflicts that advance their 
parochial interests.”147 The theory further “contends that two key intervening variables, 
groupness and institutional inclusivity, play decisive roles in determining which countries 
are most prone to state failure and state exploitation conflicts.”148 Kahl believes that 
“violence is particularly likely in the context of high degrees of groupness (i.e., societies 
that are sharply cleaved along ethno-cultural, religious, or class-based lines) and low 
degrees of institutional inclusivity (i.e., countries with highly…and repressive political 
systems).”149  
Now, if Kahl’s theory is tailored by replacing demographic and environmental 
stress with economic stress brought about by high degree of economic injustice, 
extreme concentration of wealth, inequitable tax system, and a withholdingised 
economic system, it can not only explain the origins and roots of economic civil 
strife but also the way the state looks at them, repressing every notion to confront 
them per dictates of the reality principle. Kahl’s theory of DES is modified to induct 
Withholdingisation Induced Economic Stress (WIES) into the analysis as depicted in 
Figure 9 below.  
 








 Withholdingisation of the Economic System—A Source of Revenue, Civil Strife, or Dutch Disease+? 505 
Fig. 9.  State Exploitation 
 
 
What it stipulates is that WIES partly borne by active economic agents (producers) 
on account of coercive withholding liabilities and higher input costs resulting from state-
sponsored Chinacutting of economic transactions (a good portion of which gets stuck in 
the pricing structure), and partly by passive economic agents (consumers) on account of 
higher prices of final goods and services consumed—operates on the society, the 
economy, and the polity as a domineering factor cyclically resulting in further taxflation. 
Groupness and Institutional Inclusivity get into an intense interplay and take either of the 
routes i.e. State Exploitation or State Captivity leading to civil strife, which, if not 
arrested anytime at initial stages, can potentially create a specter of Sate Failure. In a 
scenario of higher groupnessisation, the state is put to direct exploitation and 
enhancement of economic agenda. In other situations, the state is brought to a captive 
condition to rig the policy formulation process to achieve economic goals. Predictably, 
whatever path is taken, it would lead to, and end up preservation and promotion of the 
extant economic status quo. Over the past three decades, while PML(N)-led coalitions 
ravished Pakistani state through State Captivity mode, those led by PPP adopted State 
Exploitation mode. It may be noted that State Captivity mode, since it can involve 
tinkering with policy formulation in critical areas of statecraft, can have more far-
reaching effects as compared with State Exploitation mode.  
A la under DES, when WIES starts operating on the people with shared economic 
interests, they form groups, relate and organise themselves, evolve effective interest-
articulation channels, and start behaving like living organisms obsessed with instinctual 
self-preservation, self-reproduction and growth. In fact, all economic dispensations do 
help create economic group identities, but withholdingisation, by its very nature, does so 
at an exorbitant pace—in the process, generating living economic identities, sub-
identities, and even mini-sub identities. How does it actually happen? No sooner a 
withholding provision is brought onto the tax statute, or a withholding tax rate is altered 
or its attendant filing regime is adjusted, the pre-existing economic environment being 
essentially zero-sum, the change is definitely going to be a bane for some and boon for 
some. Immediately, all economic interest groups affected by the change get into gear 
with their own interests to protect vis-à-vis others. All economic identities then start to 
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exert pressure on the polity, which since has put no mechanism of interest group 
articulation in place, gets to entertain them selectively—that is, only those that are 
connected politically or those that can buy an access bureaucratically or those that can 
apply a combination of both. This very phenomenon may have politicised commerce and 
commercialised politics in Pakistan as all interest groups strive to get heard in the state’s 
policy-making structures.150 It would be seen that withholdingisation has unionised the 
entire economy with every single economic sector being hit by a single withholding tax 
rate becoming a group; hence, the greater the level of withholdingisation in the economy 
the greater the level of economic groupnessisation.151  
While DES primarily deals and is concerned with groupnessisation of scarcity, 
WIES deals with groupnessisation of affluence, groupnessisation of economic interests, 
and groupnessisation of deprivation. Firstly, the groupnessisation of affluence represents 
the primordial economic order extant in Pakistan. This groups tries to and does exercise 
its influence at the strategic level e.g. abolition of taxes on capital gains, wealth, gifts, 
inheritance and agricultural income etc.152 Secondly, groupnessisation of economic 
interests—chiefly the product of a withholdingised economic system—represents 
currently the most wide-spread and most effective factionalisation when weighed in 
terms of its ability to impact policy formulation at the tactical level e.g. change in 
withholding regime. In this connection, real life illustrations could be that of traders 
protesting against imposition of withholding tax on banking transactions; realtors 
resisting valuations prescribed by the government; young doctors and paramedics 
demanding job security; teachers and clerks protesting against unjustifiable service 
conditions having been—all having been indirectly hit by withholdingisation-induced 
taxflation. Thirdly, groupnessisation of deprivation—that represents the dregs and the 
marginalised of the withholdingised economic order—are the societal residue, who are 
yet to be organised, get cognition and learn to do interest-articulation. They are the most 
dangerous set of souls for three reasons. One, they are made to pay tax through taxation 
of transactions although they are not liable to pay any. Two, they being on the lower rung 
of the economic stratification, bear the major brunt of taxflation. Three, the state having 
withholdingised the economic system, is neither able to generate enough revenues to 
undertake effective distributive engagement with them nor are they able to muster enough 
capital to enter a highly taxflated economic market.  
Given the current state of affairs, Pakistani polity must brace for the time when 
groupness of deprivation would acquire its cognition. Groupness of deprivation may still 
be nested in time, but there are definite symptoms that already betray gathering of the 
clouds. Its real-time exhibition would occur when the marginalised millions of Pakistan 
having absolutely no stakes in the system would throw in the towel, and take to streets 
and start articulation their interests in agitational mode at mass level. In fact, that is the 
 
150For an extensive discussion on groupness, see S. Bailey, Legacies of race: Identities, attitudes, and 
politics in Brazil  (Stanford University Press, 2009). 
151For instance, withholdingisation treats imports under eight different categories denoted in eight 
district tax rates thereby creating eight groups who are constantly striving to engage tax policy making circles in 
Islamabad and out-negotiating one-another for ever-more favourable group taxation regimes. 
152For further and in-depth analysis see Husain, Pakistan: The economy of an elitist state; Kochanek, 
Interest groups and development: Business and politics in Pakistan; Ahmed, “Pakistan: Extraction, elites and 
state autonomy: A theoretical configuration.” 
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specter that could possibly be equated with the scenario of tax war. It is not that a war is 
necessarily fought between two regular militias pitted against eachother across a clearly 
demarcated line; it can take multiple manifestations. A tax war could potentially occur 
when the polity tries to acquire or regain its (relative) autonomy by making a desperate 
effort to improve its extractive system; the groupness of affluence, and groupness of 
interest resist the specter resulting in violent protests which is a tested ploy of industrial 
elite and business elite towards achieving their economic agenda. It could even be reverse 
of it, that is, when groupness of deprivation—completely excluded and isolated from the 
system—out of desperation, take the process of economic equalisation in their own 
hands. Without being monocausal, it is reasonable to believe that WIES can seriously 
impact and be a determining factor of the forward march of all three, the society, the 
economy and the polity in the years and decades to come. 
 
6.4.   Source of Dutch Disease? 
In this part, it would be seen how withholdingisation eats into the very vitals of the 
economy at the macro level with all the spurious outcomes. Like also shown in Figure 10, 
somewhere around 2013 and onwards, something curious appears to have happened to 
the economy. While the similarly-circumstanced nations—particularly those with 
substantial oil import bills—were having a bonanza in the wake of nose-diving petro-
prices in the international market, Pakistani exports started to decline; FDI that, in fact, 
had never been impressive in good times, did not pick up even in the wake of much-
touted CPEC-induced inflows; home remittances began showing signs of stress; and 
industrial productivity dwindled notwithstanding uninterrupted power supply at the 
expense of other sectors. Intriguingly, around that very time the process of 
withholdingisation starts to culminate—coming to full bloom. 
 
Fig. 10.  Pakistan’s External Sector 
 
Source: SBP. 
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Simultaneously, however, revenue numbers were claimed to have risen steeply; 
FBR was painted a champion organisation; and Finance Minister was lionised as “the 
best” in the business.153 This, on the very face of it, looked bizarre as tax revenues being 
a function of economic activity with an unquestionably established direct relationship 
could not have taken a surge while the rest of the economy was depressed. This paradox 
though earlier identified, yet has rarely been resolved. Like already posited 
withholdingisation inflicts the economy with something akin to Dutch Disease.154 The 
Dutch Disease could be defined in a variety of ways keeping in view the contextual 
imperatives, but in its simplest conception, it means an outgrowth of one particular sector 
or side of the economy in relation to others, say, large hydrocarbons or mineral reserves, 
inducing substantial sharp inflows of foreign currency causing exchange rate 
appreciation, and in the process, stunting other sectors and industries, and rendering them 
less price-competitive in the international export market—thereby  having a negative 
influence on the economy in overall terms. 
When broken down Dutch Disease is attended and evidenced by an appreciation in 
real exchange rate due to abnormal inflows of foreign exchange; decline in exports; surge 
in imports; resource-shift from the lagging to the booming sectors; and erosion of 
industrial productivity and competitiveness. All these factors are not only interdependent 
but mutually reinforcing, too. The paper ascribes the standard role associated with 
hydrocarbons in the Netherlands’ context to withholdingisation in Pakistan’s and 
analyses Dutch Disease effect within this framework.155 
Pakistan’s exchange rate is admittedly overvalued by as much as 22 percent in 
overall terms, and since 2013, around 27 percent. Interestingly, the exchange rate is 
overvalued not because of any excessive inflows of foreign exchange into Pakistan but 
because of (a) non-devaluation of rupee vis-à-vis other currencies, and (b) relative 
devaluation of Pak rupee’s rival currencies. Since 2013, while Pakistan rupee devalued 
by a meager 3 percent, the Malaysian, Indonesian, Indian, and South Korean currencies 
have devalued by 38, 47, 30, and 7 percent, respectively. In Pakistan, devaluation of 
currency has traditionally been a function of non-monetary and political factors. The 
most important factors discouraging the government from devaluation of currency are a 
consequential sudden jump in debt-stock which is denominated in rupee, and an 
aggregated national ego overly associated with the value of the currency. While rupee 
non-devaluation may not be a direct result of withholdingisation, the phenomenon had an 
identical impact—increased price of exportable goods. This could well be called the 
Dutch Disease effect with a plus sign in that the currency does not appreciate as there are 
no exaggerated inflows of foreign exchange, but still cost of production goes up 
substantially due to withholdingisation. Ahmad & Mohammad have argued that foreign 
aid inflows also have had a Dutch Disease like effect on the economy.156 
 
153Shahbaz Rana, “Ishaq Dar declared “Finance Minister of the year,” The Express Tribune, October 9, 2016. 
154The concept of Dutch Disease was originally developed by W. Max Corden & J. Peter Neary in 1982 
in the context of the Netherlands in reference to large discoveries of hydrocarbons in the 1960s and 1970s. 
155Khaleeq Kiani, “Energy sector contributes over Rs. 1 trillion to national kitty,” Dawn, September 7, 
2017. 
156Ehtisham Ahmad & Azizali Mohammed, “Pakistan, the United States and the I.M.F: Great game or a 
curious case of dutch disease without the oil?,” in Working Papers (London: Asia Research Centre, 2012). 
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The goods and services produced in a Dutch Diseased economy are not price-
competitive in the international market. This is exactly what happens in a 
withholdingised economy. It is argued that withholdingisation negatively impacts the 
economic system by pushing up the transaction cost thereby causing taxflation of sorts. 
Wahid & Wallace point out that in Pakistan, while “most taxes are passed forward, taxes 
on inputs will ultimately rest in the prices of final goods,”157 Dissecting Pakistan tax 
system, they go on to posit that “if goods produced in the corporate sector were largely 
sold on the world market, it would be difficult to shift the tax burden onto the price of the 
good,” and since “Pakistani goods would simply not be competitive and in the medium 
term, industries would suffer and eventually die off without government intervention.”158 
On the basis of industrial output data for the F/Y 2006-07, they also argued that “the 
manufacturing sector was projected to account for approximately 36 per cent of the 
income tax,” whereby “the ability to shift the corporate tax forward into output prices is 
hindered to some extent by the competition in the world market.”159 Figure 11 is the 
simplest illustration of withholdingisation-induced Dutch Disease effect. The picture 
exhibits the economic market at an equilibrium point where supplier is ready to sell his 
product at 100, and buyer is ready to buy it at 100. Now, the government imposes a 
withholding tax of 10 on buyer to be collected by supplier, and since the tax has a near-
full potential of being passed on, the price jumps to 110. Likewise, when government 
also imposes a tax of 10 on the supplier to be collected by the buyer—his price also goes 
up to 110; hence, the new Dutch Disease Equilibrium, which is taxflated and expensive 
not by 10 but by 20.   
 
Fig. 11.  CAS Effect-DAS Effect 
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The withholdingised economy is essentially an import economy as an overvalued 
exchange rate renders exports less competitive externally and imports more competitive 
internally resulting in even daily consumables cheaper in the domestic market. This is 
particularly true of Chinese products flooding Pakistani markets unfavourably sustained 
by Pak-China FTA and CPEC-sentiment. When an overvalued exchange rate spurred 
imports, instead of fixing the fundamentals of the economy—the tax system or the 
exchange rate—purely under political considerations, SBP ended up enforcing cash 
margins @ 100 percent, and FBR imposing a regulatory duty on so-called non-essential 
imports. The resultant unabated import onslaught has triggered a process of 
deindustrialisation whereby not only that industry is being shut down but it is also being 
relocated to China, Bangladesh and the Middle East for production of export goods as 
well as for import and consumption back in Pakistan. 
Without being monocausal withholdingisation may be at the roots of fast-
waning competitiveness of Pakistani industrial sector. Energy costs have gone up for 
the industry chiefly because of upfront load of withholding taxes, making industrial 
energy most expensive in the region as an industrial input. It was reported that 
energy sector along contributed a hefty sum of Rs. 650 billion during F/Y 2017 
mainly on account of upfront withholding taxes.160 Likewise, gas as an industrial 
input is 37 percent cheaper in Europe as compared to Pakistan majorly because of 
tax-padding at production and distribution stages. Transportation costs are about 25 
percent higher in Pakistan vis-à-vis the regional countries—due majorly to upfront 
withholdingisation. A wide-going withholdingisation occurring over the past three 
decades may have “distorted incentive structures in Pakistan, and weakened the 
desire for self-reliance.”161  Pakistani tariff levels are above par and serve “as a major 
impediment to integration in global supply chains, hampering the diversification of 
exports.”162 Kardar, amplifying this point, posits that “Policies, transactional 
processes and import tariff structures are critical in enabling firms to participate 
effectively in global value chains based on core competencies—manufacturing of 
different components and services like design, logistics, marketing and 
distribution,”163 but withholdingisation is inimical to all these. 
In a Dutch Diseased economy market forces drive resources from the lagging to 
the booming sectors reinforcing the fundamental malaise and reproducing its negative 
effects. This is what also occurs in a withholdingised economy and could be explicated 
from three different perspectives. One, resource-shift from industry to import, real estate 
and other non-productive sectors as in Pakistan. Two, resources travel from formal to 
informal sectors because of price competition between goods and services produced in 
the formal and informal sectors. Further, “if more substitutes that exist in the informal 
sector, the more difficult it would be for firms in the legal, tax-paying, formal corporate 
sector to pass off the corporate tax in the form of higher output prices.”164 It is believed 
that Pakistan’s black economy, at any given time, may be equal to the size of the formal 
 
160Kiani, “Energy sector contributes over Rs. 1 trillion to national kitty.” 
161Mohammed, “Pakistan, the United States and the I.M.F: Great game or a curious case of dutch 
disease without the oil?.” 
162Kardar, “Amplified policy distortions.” 
163Ibid. 
164Wahid and Wallace, “The equity debate in tax policy,” 281. 
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economy. Three, intra-institutional resource-shift also takes place as more and more 
resources are diverted to withholdingisation (booming sector) at the expense of the 
traditional tax system (lagging sector) reinforcing all of its negative fallouts. 
Moreover, high taxes and duties in a withholdingised economic system 
compulsively induce complicated regulations and procedures to manage trade,” whereby 
regulatory burden further raises “the cost of steering trade, besides incentivising 
smuggling.”165 However, excess deduction or collection is attendant fallout of 
withholdingisation. Since government is constantly striving for revenues, it chooses to 
withhold refunds so desperately needed by the exporters. The exporters then 
compulsively have to approach banks for working and export finance capital. While 
mark-up paid by industrialists gets added to product cost, the government successfully 
propagates loans so taken as industrial credit off-take to score points in media and the 
parliament and paint halcyon picture of the economy. All said over-deduction further 
holds back exporters’ potential to compete internationally. 
To sum up, the ultimate disturbing consequence of withholdingisation “is a 
polarised, dichotomous economic edifice,” which “is characterised by heavily protected 
sub-segments of industry, that essentially serve the domestic market enjoying relatively 
high profit levels while those operating in global markets find survival difficult,” 
whereby “the pattern of industrialisation is fast changing for the worst; it is one which is 
not viable without high walls sheltering it from competitors.”166 To make things worse, 
withholdingisation comes down hard with its blunt blade of Chinacutting of transactions 
and taxflation completely sapping competitiveness of the industrial sector. It is in this 
context that Pakistan’s sluggish economy, deindustrialisation, sprawling black economy, 
sickly revenue generation, receding exports, FDI and home remittance may be seen, 
analysed and framed in for policy refinement. The foregoing debate as regards the 
paradox of plenty created by brute withholdingisation by generating easy and unhealthy 
revenues for the elitist state, and the way it eats into the very vitals of the economy, opens 
new vistas for future research particularly as to how it would affect the societal 
processes—social cohesion. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
One can draw curtains on the withholdingisation debate and its fallouts by 
posing, and if possible, answering, five inter-related and mutually interdependent 
questions, namely, is the system really fettered enough to justify the epithet of 
withholdingisation with all its hard-sounding connotations; if the system is effectively 
withholdingised, is it generating revenues sufficient enough for the state in quantitative 
terms and healthy enough in qualitative terms; is withholdingisation constructive or 
destructive to the citizen-state relations—so very important a dimension of statecraft in 
yet evolving states; is withholdingised system supportive or disruptive to the 
aspirations of economic development and prosperity of the nation; and, if a 
withholdingised system—with all its down- and upsides—sustain itself and hold the 
state and society together—futuristically. 
 
165Kardar, “Amplified policy distortions.” 
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The first question being relatively less subjective is perhaps the easiest one to 
answer. What one knows now is that the elitist state has increasingly shifted its extractive 
liability onto the withholding machine; added more and more withholding provisions to 
the tax code brining in increasingly larger tracts of gross economic activity and greater 
number of economic agents into its fold; innovated to optimally scavenge on tools like 
FTR and MTR regimes, CAS mode and DAS mode, and transaction-taxing to earn easy 
bucks; improvised the coercive (punitive and prosecutive) diktats to deal with 
delinquents—defaulting withholders. All these insights—as empirically explicated in 
section 3, lead one to an unmistakable conclusion that it is not only the extractive system 
but the economic system that has now been effectively withholdingised. There is a 
complex preponderance operating on the entire economy at any level generating vast 
amounts of dissonance amongst both its passive and active agents repelling any potential 
new entrants. 
Turning to the next question, that is, if the withholdingised system capable of 
generating revenues sufficient enough for the state in quantitative terms and healthy 
enough in qualitative terms, the plain answer would be in a trite negative. What one 
already knows is that the system is generating under 10 percent of GDP in tax revenues 
and the state has to compulsively borrow roughly the same amount every year to sustain 
itself with all the adverse fallouts for the economy and its long-term sustainability. If the 
entire body of scholarship created so far on the fiscal function of the state has any 
relevance or meaning for Pakistan, brutally withholdingised system renders it completely 
irrelevant as it defies all logic and commonsense, in that, it is completely uprooted from 
standard normative foundations; disengaged and extricated from the macroeconomic 
framework; has created mega economic distortions, and sapped self-healing (corrective) 
ability of the system apparently beyond recuperation.  
The third question—if withholdingisation’s role towards the building of state-
citizen relation in Pakistan is constructive or destructive has to be reckoned destructive. 
Heightened groupnessisation triggered by withholdingisation constantly reproducing new 
economic identities, which then ferociously hover and converge on the embittered state 
for exercise of favourable policy choices, can hardly ever induce a halcyon influence for 
the bonding between the citizen and the state. This deduction gets further strength from 
the fact that about half of the total tax generated from withholdingisation remains 
unclaimed, and still almost 90 percent of claimed excess deductions are never refunded; 
hence extortion; hence unjust; and therefore, can no way be taken to contribute positively 
to the processes of state-building. This factor operates in addition to the wide-spread 
taxflation for both the producer and the consumer. The penultimate question—is 
withholdingisation good for the economy in overall terms—can only elicit an immediate 
negative response. The fragility of the macroeconomic indicators when coupled with 
external sector’s downward slide—if not a plunge—and viewed from the prism of 
taxflation-induced incompetitiveness of the economy vis-à-vis the rest of world leaves no 
room to doubt there is a trade-off between withholdingisation and competitiveness.  
Lastly, the question if a withholdingised economic system, in general and 
extractive system, in particular, can undergrid the state and hold it together futuristically. 
This subjective stipulation though empirically intractable yet can be best understood 
through circumstantial evidence to prove that a withholdingised system being 
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anachronistic in nature does not belong to the present times, at least. The political 
settlement underlying the institutional configuration of the state—perhaps any state or 
any institutional framework for that matter—cannot be expected to have design capacity 
enough to manage negative externalities of the magnitude that as brutally 
withholdingised a system as that of Pakistan is currently producing. Withholdingisation, 
with time, may have entrenched too wide and too deep into the system attaining the status 
of a Superstatute of sorts. This is further evident from the fact that over a dozen reform 
efforts that have been made to improve the revenue system have miserably failed 
producing counter-results—as having been sponsored and steered by Elites Ltd—
counter-results being more withholdingisation; more (extractive) system incapacitation; 
more debt accumulation.  
In a nutshell, the paper first gleans and then hammers home the point that there is 
absolutely no escape from having a capacitated and functional revenue system in place to 
operate the state’s extractive function—capacitated enough to generate both healthy and 
sufficient revenues for the state. This is simply because the cost of running the state has to 
be picked up by the underlying society itself. This cost can be preponed, paid at par and 
time, or postponed (for a time), but a permanent deferral is not possible—not even 
theoretically. The cost of maintaining the state could, however, be internally shifted; that 
is, transferred from those who ought to bear it to those who ought not to bear it or bear it 
only marginally; the latter scenario can occur when the state falls captive as in 
Pakistan.167 It is further driven home that consistently meeting the cost of maintaining the 
state operating under the pleasure principle—brute withholdingisation, incessant 
borrowing, and endless harvesting of rents at the international level—has a certain price-
tag for the society and the state perpetuating both intra- and intergenerational distortions 
and inequities. Likewise, perverse internal transference of tax burden by power-wielding 
oligarchs (including via withholdingisation) to the not-so-lucky, yet un- and disorganised, 
and unrepresented marginalised millions, has its implications for the economy like 
legitimation of extortion, extension and expansion of inequitable taxing structures, 
inducing of the Dutch Disease into effect, creation of macro-economic distortions, and 
uprooting of the tax system from its normative foundations.  
This is because states even when in adolescence cannot afford to shun on the 
reality principle. Pakistani state having operated on the pleasure principle for too 
leisurely and too long has now gone into a state of double jeopardy in that it is bearing 
even above-par national cost of tax collection and yet does not have an effective and 
functional revenue administration in place—the one capable of generating both  sufficient 
and healthy revenues. Thus, the choice eventually rests with the state as to whether it 
intends continuing with its leisurely ways by out-contracting its extractive function to 
private collectors—withholders, or corrects the wrong done—to itself and its people—by 
putting in place a capacitated, functional and effective extractive system. This may be 
added that some facade of a tax system has to be there—as part of the state structure. If 
not a properly functional tax system—capable and capacitated enough to undertake 
across-the-board, rule-based, comprehensive, and differentiated taxation; it would 
 
167See, for a detailed analysis, Ahmed, “Pakistan: Extraction, elites and state autonomy: A theoretical 
configuration.” 
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undertake undifferentiated, perverse, and pro-elite taxation as done so far—with 
respective outcomes of both taxation types ostensible, it is up to the society to decide as 
to what kind of revenue system it wants in place. The prognosis, however, is that 
capacitation of extractive system would continue to hover on the conscience of the polity 
as an unfinished agenda of state-formation keeping the economy under duress, the society 
under stress and the state on sedatives. In the final analysis, Withholdingisation is not, 
and must not be taken as some paltry sub-subsystem of some system of the state; it has, in 
fact, over time, grown into an economic system unto itself as much as Slavery was the 
economic system of the American South, Mercantilism the economic system of the 
Colonial Europe, and Hydrocarbons the economic system of the Middle East, and needs 
to be approached and understood in that very context. 
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